A probabilistic weak formulation of mean field games and applications

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Price impact model

- n brokers trade in the same asset and maximize wealth.
- Brokers face identical limit order books.
- Broker i controls his rate of trade αⁱ_t.
- The asset price is a martingale plus a drift given by price impact. (Almgren-Chriss '01, Carlin et al '09)

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Asset price:

$$dS_t = \frac{\gamma}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n c'(\alpha_t^j) dt + \sigma_0 dB_t$$

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• Broker i's wealth is $V_t^i = V_0^i + X_t^i S_t + K_t^i$, or

$$dV_t^i = \left(\frac{\gamma}{n}\sum_{j=1}^n c'(\alpha_t^j)X_t^i - c(\alpha_t^i)\right)dt + \sigma S_t dW_t^i + \sigma_0 X_t^i dB_t$$

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Price impact model - optimization

Broker *i* maximizes expected wealth $\mathbb{E}[V_T^i]$:

$$\begin{split} \sup_{\alpha^{i}} \mathbb{E} \int_{0}^{T} \left(\frac{\gamma}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} c'(\alpha_{t}^{j}) X_{t}^{i} - c(\alpha_{t}^{i}) \right) dt, \\ \text{s.t.} \ dX_{t}^{i} &= \alpha_{t}^{i} dt + \sigma dW_{t}^{i} \end{split}$$

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Are there Nash equilibria?

Price impact model - general objectives

Additional objective functions G and F allow for time-T liquidation demands, tracking requirements, etc.

$$\sup_{\alpha^{i}} \mathbb{E}\left[G(X_{T}^{i}) + \int_{0}^{T} \left(\frac{\gamma}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} c'(\alpha_{t}^{j}) X_{t}^{i} - c(\alpha_{t}^{i}) - F(t, X_{t}^{i})\right) dt\right],$$

s.t. $dX_{t}^{i} = \alpha_{t}^{i} dt + \sigma dW_{t}^{i}$

The optimization problems are coupled through the empirical distribution of the controls. Limit $n \to \infty$?

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Mean field stochastic differential games (MFG)

Player *i*'s state process and objective:

$$\sup_{\alpha^{i}} \mathbb{E}\left[\int_{0}^{T} f(t, X_{t}^{i}, \overline{\mu}_{t}^{n}, \overline{\nu}_{t}^{n}, \alpha_{t}^{i}) dt + g(X_{T}^{i}, \overline{\mu}_{T}^{n})\right],$$

s.t. $dX_{t}^{i} = b\left(t, X_{t}^{i}, \overline{\mu}_{t}^{n}, \alpha_{t}^{i}\right) dt + \sigma(t, X_{t}^{i}) dW_{t}^{i},$
 $\overline{\mu}_{t}^{n} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \delta_{X_{t}^{j}}, \quad \overline{\nu}_{t}^{n} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \delta_{\alpha_{t}^{j}}$

We study the mean field limit, as proposed (with no $\overline{\nu}_t^n$ dependence) by Lasry & Lions and independently by Caines, Huang, & Malhamé in '06.

Limit $n \to \infty$

- 1. Fix measure flows $t \mapsto (\mu_t, \nu_t)$
- 2. Solve a standard optimal control problem

$$\sup_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}\left[\int_{0}^{T} f(t, X_{t}, \mu_{t}, \nu_{t}, \alpha_{t}) dt + g(X_{T}, \mu_{T})\right], \text{ s.t.}$$
$$dX_{t} = b(t, X_{t}, \mu_{t}, \alpha_{t}) dt + \sigma(t, X_{t}) dW_{t},$$

- 3. Let μ'_t denote the law of the optimally controlled state process at time t and ν'_t the law of the optimal control at time t.
- 4. Find a fixed point $(\mu'_t, \nu'_t) = (\mu_t, \nu_t)$.

Existence and uniqueness theory

Any approach to stochastic optimal control may be applied in step 2.

- 1. PDEs Lasry & Lions, Caines et al.
- 2. Stochastic maximum principle Carmona & Delarue, Bensoussan et al.

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3. Weak formulation

Assumptions

- compact convex control space A
- \blacktriangleright admissible controls $\mathbb{A}=$ progressively measurable A-valued processes
- b, f, g jointly measurable and continuous in (μ, ν, a), at points where μ ∼ Lebesgue
- σ is measurable and bounded away from zero, and there exists a unique strong solution to dX_t = σ(t, X_t)dW_t

- *b*, σ bounded
- some growth assumptions for f and g

Setup

On
$$(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$$
, solve $dX_t = \sigma(t, X_t) dW_t$. For (μ, α) fixed,

$$\frac{dP^{\mu,\alpha}}{dP} := \exp\left[\int_0^T \sigma^{-1} b(t, X_t, \mu_t, \alpha_t) dW_t - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^T |\sigma^{-1} b(t, X_t, \mu_t, \alpha_t)|^2 dt\right]$$

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Under $P^{\mu,\alpha}$, X is a weak solution of the state equation,

$$dX_t = b(t, X_t, \mu_t, \alpha_t)dt + \sigma(t, X_t)dW_t^{\mu, \alpha}$$

Let $\Phi(\mu, \alpha)_t = (P^{\mu, \alpha} \circ X_t^{-1}, P^{\mu, \alpha} \circ \alpha_t^{-1}).$

Setup

For (μ, ν) fixed, define the value function

$$V_t^{\mu,\nu} := \operatorname{ess\,sup}_{\alpha \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E}^{P^{\mu,\alpha}} \left[\int_t^T f(t, X_t, \mu_t, \nu_t, \alpha_t) dt + g(X_T, \mu_T) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right]$$

Hamiltonian and maximized Hamiltonian:

$$\begin{split} h(t, x, \mu, \nu, z, a) &:= f(t, x, \mu, \nu, a) + z \cdot \sigma^{-1} b(t, x, \mu, a), \\ H(t, x, \mu, \nu, z) &:= \sup_{a \in \mathcal{A}} h(t, x, \mu, \nu, z, a) \end{split}$$

Can show $V_t^{\mu,\nu}$ solves the BSDE

$$\begin{cases} dV_t^{\mu,\nu} &= -H(t, X_t, \mu_t, \nu_t, Z_t^{\mu,\nu})dt + Z_t^{\mu,\nu}dW_t, \\ V_T^{\mu,\nu} &= g(X_T, \mu_T) \end{cases}$$

By comparison principle, the set of optimal controls is exactly

$$\mathbb{A}(\mu,\nu) := \{ \alpha \in \mathbb{A} : \alpha_t \in \mathcal{A}(t, X_t, \mu_t, \nu_t, Z_t^{\mu,\nu}) \ dt \times dP - a.e. \}$$
$$\mathcal{A}(t, x, \mu, \nu, z) := \arg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} h(t, x, \mu, \nu, z, a)$$

Existence and uniqueness

A MFG solution is a fixed point

$$(\mu,\nu) \in \Phi(\mu,\mathbb{A}(\mu,\nu)) = \{\Phi(\mu,\alpha) : \alpha \in \mathbb{A}(\mu,\nu)\}$$

Theorem

- Assume the Hamiltonian h is concave in a and f = f₁(t, x, μ, a) + f₂(t, x, μ, ν). Then there exists a fixed point.
- ► Assume the Hamiltonian h is strictly concave in a, f = f₁(t, µ, ν) + f₂(t, x, a), g = g(x), and b = b(t, x, a). Then the fixed point is unique.

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Proof.

1. Kakutani's fixed point theorem. 2. Translate Lasry & Lions' proof into probabilistic language. $\hfill\square$

Approximate equilibria for the finite-player game

Theorem

If $\alpha = \alpha(t, X_{\cdot})$ is an optimal feedback control for the MFG problem, then the strategy profiles $\alpha(t, X_{\cdot}^{i})$ form an approximate Nash equilbrium for the finite-player game - for some $\epsilon_n \downarrow 0$, for each n, no player in the n-player game can increase his expected reward by more than ϵ_n by unilaterally changing strategy.

Price impact model, revisited

Price impact model corresponds to:

$$\blacktriangleright b(t, x, \mu, \alpha) = \alpha$$

σ constant

•
$$g(x,\mu) = G(x)$$

•
$$f(t, x, \mu, \nu, \alpha) = \gamma x \int c' d\nu - c(\alpha) - F(t, x).$$

Theorem

For a bounded order book, with c' continuous, the mean field price impact model has a solution. Moreover, the errors ϵ_n are $O(1/\sqrt{n})$.

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Other types of interactions

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- Sub-populations or Types
 - $f(t, x, \mu, \nu, a) = \hat{f}(t, x, F_1(\mu), \dots, F_m(\mu), \nu, a)$, where $F_i(\mu)(B) := \mathbf{1}_{\{\mu(B_i)>0\}}\mu(B \cap B_i)/\mu(B_i)$ and $B_i \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ have positive Lebesgue measure

e.g. income brackets