

Credit risk: a complex system seen from an actuarial perspective

José Garrido

Department of Mathematics and Statistics
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada

2nd Québec–Ontario Workshop on Insurance Mathematics
Fields Institute, Toronto
February 3, 2012

(joint work with Prof. A. Balbás, U. Carlos III of Madrid, Spain and
Dr. Ramin Okhrati, Technical U. of Vienna, Austria)

Research funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)

FROM THE PRESIDENT
RALPH BLANCHARD

Getting to the Right Answer



Question: "What is the difference between God and an actuary?"

Answer: "God knows that He's not an actuary."

(Like overheard during my recent travels.)
Actuaries are typically involved in modeling or analyzing risks using faulty data—data that are both incomplete and erroneous. This data is from the past, but the present is different from the past and the future will be different from the present. We combine all this with subjective inputs from various sources, some of which are of uncertain reliability if not outright biased. If we then produce a single answer as a result, the only thing we know for certain is that the final outcome won't match our answer. In other words, our answer will be wrong.

If the only assurance we have is that our answer will be wrong, where does the value from the actuarial analysis come from? How do we get to the "right" answer?

Perhaps we can get there by acknowledging that the real value of our work is not from the single answer that we may produce. The value instead comes from the understanding that arises from the analysis—the understanding of the options and the possibilities, the opportunities and the risks regarding the business decision to be taken. It is when this understanding is shared with the various decision makers (such as those in claims, underwriting, and rated reinsurance) that the real value to the operation is achieved.

Yet many actuaries insist on focusing on the single answer. Why is this? What creates this blind spot for many in the profession?

Perhaps it is our training.

Nearly all actuaries excelled in math, from the early elementary grades right up through college. These math courses were typically focused on having us come up with the one right answer and in nearly all cases there was only one right answer. The classroom training (at least the training that I had) rewarded those that were first to produce the one right answer. The focus was on speed and having the result represent your work—and only your work. If you needed help it was a sign of

reduced skill level. A math test was not a team event.

As a result, it should be no surprise that many actuaries focus exclusively on "the answer" when they communicate their work product to others. It should also be no surprise that they tend to defend this result against any and all doubters or naysayers, which no doubt provided fodder for the actuarial joke at the beginning of this column. This is what they've been trained to do (and selected for) since their early days in the classroom.

However, the business world is not the same as the classroom. In the world outside the classroom, success is usually measured on a group basis, not an individual basis. Actuaries need to be team players and recognize (and trumpet) the insights that were gleaned in their work towards an answer. The stronger actuaries are able to do this, adapting successfully from the classroom to the business environment. But how do we get more actuaries to successfully transition from the classroom to the business environment?

As is the case for most long-standing problems, there are no easy solutions. There is also unlikely to be a single solution. The following are some possible paths for various contributors to the current environment to mull upon.

Academia—Incorporate into math courses more team-oriented assignments and foster more of an environment where success for an individual is at least partly a function of the success as a group. Some colleges already incorporate this team-oriented mindset in certain areas, encouraging classrooms to work together on some projects and to leverage each other's strengths so that all can excel.¹ Yes, this may be harder to grade, and yes, it risks giving too much credit to a free rider, but the reward is hopefully worth the risk.

Supervisors and clients of actuaries—Refuse to accept an actuarial communication that stops at "the answer." Insist that the findings, risks, and possible alternatives be included in any such communication. This mindset can be found in the documentation requirements in Liquid Claim Estimates (SOP).²

Employers of actuaries—Include teambuilding training for your staff.

From the President, page 6

¹ I based such an approach a few years ago at King's College of Art & Design. They stressed to their students that they were all in it together, that the reputation of one depended on how pretty on the reputation of the other. But almost had a strong reputation of the current students had a strong reputation and resources.

² Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 40, as issued by the CAS Actuarial Standards Board.

[Source: The (CAS) Actuarial Review, August 2011]

Jokes and the actuary

Question: “What is the difference between God and an actuary?”

Answer: “God knows that He’s not an actuary.”

(Joke overheard during my recent travels.)

Looking Backward

"The future ain't what it used to be."

—Logi Ierem

Several years ago, I was browsing through some old magazines at a relative's house and came across a 1976 article from a group of futurists. Each contributor was giving their view of what the world would look like in the future. By the time I read the article, that "future" was at least partly in the past.¹

I obtained two valuable lessons from that retrospective look at the futurists' predictions. The first was that being a futurist is a difficult profession, as many (most?) of the predictions made in the article were very wrong. There was a clear tendency to view the world through the filter of what the futurist had previously experienced. There was no recognizably ability to anticipate how the world would change. For example, one of the authors appeared to believe that by around the year 2000 "we will be living in the post petroleum era."

The second lesson came from what some of the futurists got right. A few, not all, made note of major new developments that were happening in their time. The authors' noted correctly that these developments were going to have a major impact on the future—they weren't necessarily correct on what that impact might be, but they noted that it was probably going to be major and was worth paying attention to. For example, Isaac Asimov predicted that we will live in a "world or global village, tied together electrically, with every citizen able to communicate instantly with each other," although he didn't seem to anticipate the growth of the "virtual office."²

What does this have to do with the CAS? I believe it provides a useful lesson in our planning for the future. We need to identify and focus on what is changing in our world and be ready to adjust to those influences. We also need to acknowledge that the world is always changing and that we need to change or adapt along with it, even if we don't know exactly how it will change. This does not mean change for change's sake, "throwing out the baby with the bath water," but it does mean that standing still is not an option.

FROM THE PRESIDENT RALPH BLANCHARD



So what are some of the changes in our world that will affect our future in a significant but yet unknowable way? The following is a humble attempt to identify some.

- 1. Tremendous increase in the volume of data captured.** When I first started my career, computer storage was expensive. There was an active attempt to reduce electronic file sizes and nearly all the data captured was captured manually. In contrast, memory is now cheap and more and more data is captured electronically. This expansion is opening up new avenues for analysis that were previously inconceivable. What kind of analyses might this lead to? For what uses?
- 2. Tremendous increase in the accessibility of data.** This is a function of both the construction of databases that allow such access, and new hardware and software to bring that data to your fingertips. This includes the ability to access the data almost anywhere in the world. How will this change the profession? Will the impact be bigger for outsourcing or for the virtual office?
- 3. GLMs, data mining, predictive modeling.** These are the new tools that continue to evolve and allow us to leverage the items above. Where will this lead us? What lessons are there from the recent financial crisis, with the heavy usage of data-intensive modeling by hedge funds and the like? On a related note (linking the first three observations), given that much of the data of property/casualty companies is proprietary, will these models significantly split the market into two categories—those with the data and those without? Will the data needed to run these models become more proprietary or less proprietary in the future, and how will this affect the market?
- 4. The rise of "analytics."** You don't have to be an actuary to apply the new tools mentioned above. In fact, the training of some folks may be more tailored toward the use of these tools than the actuarial profession (e.g., those with advanced degrees in statistics). My personal belief is that understanding the data and the environment where data are used still counts

From the President, page 5

¹ For those interested, the article was "The World That Lies Beyond the Future" from the July 1976 issue of National Geographic. A nice color example of the paths of being a futurist is also evident from the book *Looking Backward: 2080* by Edward Bellamy in 1888, from which the title of this article was taken.

² Surely all would be remote access, except for the open-endedness of some of the predictions. These predictions surely didn't give a firm date for that future, leaving open for possibility that they might eventually be right.

³ It has, could, have, let us be clear. "None of the cited authors were at [in their attempt at predicting the future] may have any remaining when over 25 years from now."

[Source: The (CAS) Actuarial Review, November 2011]

1. Credit risk models, a review
2. Credit risk under under jumps
3. Credit risk models with risk measures

Baseball and the actuary

“The future ain’t what it used to be.”

—Yogi Berra

1. Credit risk models, a review
2. Credit risk under under jumps
3. Credit risk models with risk measures

Abstract

Credit risk models share several common characteristics with actuarial risk theory models. Even if the problems studied are different, their solutions are similar in some respects.

Abstract

Credit risk models share several common characteristics with actuarial risk theory models. Even if the problems studied are different, their solutions are similar in some respects.

Rating agencies, like Moody's or Standard and Poor's use econometrics models with several variables, some quite subjective, to produce their credit ratings. We propose to revisit the problem with a more classical **actuarial approach**.

Abstract

Credit risk models share several common characteristics with actuarial risk theory models. Even if the problems studied are different, their solutions are similar in some respects.

Rating agencies, like Moody's or Standard and Poor's use econometrics models with several variables, some quite subjective, to produce their credit ratings. We propose to revisit the problem with a more classical **actuarial approach**.

Classical arbitrage-free, consistent market assumptions rule out price differences that allow risk-free profits at zero cost. Yet, over- or under-estimation of the underlying risks generate such arbitrage opportunities, as with current credit ratings on European bonds. We introduce an alternate ranking based on **risk measures**.

Overview:

- 1. Credit risk models, a review
 - 1.1 Introduction
 - 1.2 Classical credit risk models
 - 1.3 Information based models
- 2. Credit risk under under jump processes
 - 2.1 Introduction
 - 2.2 Preliminaries and definitions
 - 2.3 Locally risk minimization hedging
- 3. Credit risk models with risk measures
 - 3.1 Introduction
 - 3.2 Inconsistencies and market integration
 - 3.3 Credit risk measures

1. Credit risk models, a review

1.1 Introduction

Classical credit risk models can be grouped into 2 broad categories:

1. Credit risk models, a review

1.1 Introduction

Classical credit risk models can be grouped into 2 broad categories:

- ▶ Structural models

1. Credit risk models, a review

1.1 Introduction

Classical credit risk models can be grouped into 2 broad categories:

- ▶ Structural models
- ▶ Reduced form models

1. Credit risk models, a review

1.1 Introduction

Classical credit risk models can be grouped into 2 broad categories:

- ▶ Structural models
- ▶ Reduced form models

More recent research has concentrated on **information based** credit risk models.

1.2 Classical credit risk models

1.2.1 Structural models

Date back to Merton (1974, JoF), Black and Cox (1976, JoF). The **default time** of a loan is given by the first passage time of the firm's assets below a barrier.

1.2 Classical credit risk models

1.2.1 Structural models

Date back to Merton (1974, JoF), Black and Cox (1976, JoF). The **default time** of a loan is given by the first passage time of the firm's assets below a barrier.

Structural models assume that the market value of the firm is observable. Leads to **predictable** default times, especially for continuous firm value processes.

1.2 Classical credit risk models

1.2.1 Structural models

Date back to Merton (1974, JoF), Black and Cox (1976, JoF). The **default time** of a loan is given by the first passage time of the firm's assets below a barrier.

Structural models assume that the market value of the firm is observable. Leads to **predictable** default times, especially for continuous firm value processes.

The drawback is that this is **inconsistent** with market observations; investors are aware of the probable default time in advance, leading to zero short-credit spreads.

Example (Merton, 1974, JoF)

Consider the simple example of a firm with asset X that is financed by a zero-coupon bond with maturity T .

Example (Merton, 1974, JoF)

Consider the simple example of a firm with asset X that is financed by a zero-coupon bond with maturity T .

At maturity the bond pays D , if $X_T > D$, otherwise investors get X_T .

Example (Merton, 1974, JoF)

Consider the simple example of a firm with asset X that is financed by a zero-coupon bond with maturity T .

At maturity the bond pays D , if $X_T > D$, otherwise investors get X_T .

The bond payoff decomposes as

$$\min(X_T, D) = D - \max(0, D - X_T),$$

and can be considered a credit derivative, where $\max(0, X_T - D)$ represents the firm's value at time T .

Extension of Black and Cox (1976, JoF)

The payoff $D - \max(0, D - X_T)$ is that of a risk-free account and a vanilla option. Under the absence of arbitrage, if X_t is based on **Brownian motion** returns (GMB), then **Black-Scholes** formula can be used to price this credit derivative.

Extension of Black and Cox (1976, JoF)

The payoff $D - \max(0, D - X_T)$ is that of a risk-free account and a vanilla option. Under the absence of arbitrage, if X_t is based on **Brownian motion** returns (GMB), then **Black-Scholes** formula can be used to price this credit derivative.

In Merton's model, the firm can default only at time T . Black and Cox let the firm default at any time before T and the **default time** is then $\tau = \inf\{t < T; X_t < 0\}$.

Extension of Black and Cox (1976, JoF)

The payoff $D - \max(0, D - X_T)$ is that of a risk-free account and a vanilla option. Under the absence of arbitrage, if X_t is based on **Brownian motion** returns (GMB), then **Black-Scholes** formula can be used to price this credit derivative.

In Merton's model, the firm can default only at time T . Black and Cox let the firm default at any time before T and the **default time** is then $\tau = \inf\{t < T; X_t < 0\}$.

The yield y_t at $t < T$ (if $t < \tau$) is given as the solution of

$$e^{-\int_t^T r_s ds} \mathbb{P}[\tau > T | \mathfrak{F}_t] = e^{-y_t(T-t)},$$

(for $D = 1$) and the **credit spread** is $y_t - \frac{\int_t^T r_s ds}{T-t} = -\frac{\ln \mathbb{P}[\tau > T | \mathfrak{F}_t]}{T-t}$.

1.2.2 Reduced form models

Artzner and Delbaen (1995, MF), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, JoF), Duffie and Singleton (1999, RoFS) proposed a different approach to model credit risk.

1.2.2 Reduced form models

Artzner and Delbaen (1995, MF), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, JoF), Duffie and Singleton (1999, RoFS) proposed a different approach to model credit risk.

In reduced form models the probability of default is given exogenously, by a relation in terms of the **intensity process** or **hazard process** (based on market prices).

1.2.2 Reduced form models

Artzner and Delbaen (1995, MF), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, JoF), Duffie and Singleton (1999, RoFS) proposed a different approach to model credit risk.

In reduced form models the probability of default is given exogenously, by a relation in terms of the **intensity process** or **hazard process** (based on market prices).

Here the default time is totally inaccessible (**not predictable**). Jarrow and Turnbull model the default time as the **first jump time** of a Poisson process.

1.2.2 Reduced form models

Artzner and Delbaen (1995, MF), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, JoF), Duffie and Singleton (1999, RoFS) proposed a different approach to model credit risk.

In reduced form models the probability of default is given exogenously, by a relation in terms of the **intensity process** or **hazard process** (based on market prices).

Here the default time is totally inaccessible (**not predictable**). Jarrow and Turnbull model the default time as the **first jump time** of a Poisson process. Investors cannot be aware of the default time, which yields to non-zero credit spreads and useful formulas for pricing credit derivatives.

Intensity process

The main focus is on the default indicator process;

$\mathfrak{N} = (\mathfrak{N}_t)_{t \geq 0}$, where

$$\mathfrak{N}_t = 1_{\{\tau \leq t\}}$$

Intensity process

The main focus is on the default indicator process;

$\mathfrak{N} = (\mathfrak{N}_t)_{t \geq 0}$, where

$$\mathfrak{N}_t = 1_{\{\tau \leq t\}}$$

and the default time τ is a **stopping time** under a given filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$, that could be considered as the information available to investors on the market.

Intensity process

The main focus is on the default indicator process;

$\mathfrak{N} = (\mathfrak{N}_t)_{t \geq 0}$, where

$$\mathfrak{N}_t = 1_{\{\tau \leq t\}}$$

and the default time τ is a **stopping time** under a given filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$, that could be considered as the information available to investors on the market.

Difficult to use, except for simple stopped processes X , such as (non-homogeneous) Poisson.

Hazard process

Hazard process models are based on the **conditional default probability**:

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq t | \mathfrak{F}_t),$$

where the filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ is usually the same as for intensity based models, that is the information available to investors.

Hazard process

Hazard process models are based on the **conditional default probability**:

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq t | \mathfrak{F}_t),$$

where the filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ is usually the same as for intensity based models, that is the information available to investors.

For a review of both, intensity and hazard based models, see Jeanblanc and LeCam (2007, preprint).

1.3 Information based models

Reduced form models are tractable, but do not explain (in Economics terms) why default happens.

1.3 Information based models

Reduced form models are tractable, but do not explain (in Economics terms) why default happens.

Structural models give an Economics interpretation of the default time, but they do not explain the non-zero credit spreads observed on markets.

1.3 Information based models

Reduced form models are tractable, but do not explain (in Economics terms) why default happens.

Structural models give an Economics interpretation of the default time, but they do not explain the non-zero credit spreads observed on markets.

Information based credit risk models are an attempt to link the structural and reduced form approaches. The key element here is the information flow available to investors.

1. Credit risk models, a review
2. Credit risk under under jumps
3. Credit risk models with risk measures

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Classical credit risk models
- 1.3 Information based models



Figure: Agual Azúl Falls, Chiapas, Mexico

Asymmetric information

Structural and reduced form models use a single filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to represent the flow of information available to both, the firm and its investors.

Asymmetric information

Structural and reduced form models use a single filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to represent the flow of information available to both, the firm and its investors.

Information based models allow for **asymmetric** levels of information for the 2 parties (Duffie and Lando, 2001, Econ):

Asymmetric information

Structural and reduced form models use a single filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to represent the flow of information available to both, the firm and its investors.

Information based models allow for **asymmetric** levels of information for the 2 parties (Duffie and Lando, 2001, Econ):

The **reference filtration** $\mathfrak{G} = (\mathfrak{G}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ represents the market information available to investors,

Asymmetric information

Structural and reduced form models use a single filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to represent the flow of information available to both, the firm and its investors.

Information based models allow for **asymmetric** levels of information for the 2 parties (Duffie and Lando, 2001, Econ):

The **reference filtration** $\mathfrak{G} = (\mathfrak{G}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ represents the market information available to investors, excluding the default time τ .

Asymmetric information

Structural and reduced form models use a single filtration $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to represent the flow of information available to both, the firm and its investors.

Information based models allow for **asymmetric** levels of information for the 2 parties (Duffie and Lando, 2001, Econ):

The **reference filtration** $\mathfrak{G} = (\mathfrak{G}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ represents the market information available to investors, excluding the default time τ .

This **investor's filtration** $\mathfrak{F} = (\mathfrak{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ is an expansion of \mathfrak{G} that makes τ a stopping time.

Filtration expansions

Three 3 main methods of expanding \mathfrak{G} in credit risk models:

- **Progressive filtration expansion**, Gieseke (2006, JoEDC):

$$\mathfrak{F}_t = \{B \in \mathfrak{F}_\infty; \text{for some } B_t \in \mathfrak{G}_t, B \cap \{t < \tau\} = B_t \cap \{t < \tau\}\}.$$

Filtration expansions

Three 3 main methods of expanding \mathfrak{G} in credit risk models:

- **Progressive filtration expansion**, Gieseke (2006, JoEDC):

$$\mathfrak{F}_t = \{B \in \mathfrak{F}_\infty; \text{for some } B_t \in \mathfrak{G}_t, B \cap \{t < \tau\} = B_t \cap \{t < \tau\}\}.$$

- **Minimal filtration expansion**, Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2009, MoOR):

$$\mathfrak{F}_t = \mathfrak{G}_t \vee \sigma(\{\tau \leq s; s \leq t\}).$$

Filtration expansions

Three 3 main methods of expanding \mathfrak{G} in credit risk models:

- **Progressive filtration expansion**, Gieseke (2006, JoEDC):

$$\mathfrak{F}_t = \{B \in \mathfrak{F}_\infty; \text{for some } B_t \in \mathfrak{G}_t, B \cap \{t < \tau\} = B_t \cap \{t < \tau\}\}.$$

- **Minimal filtration expansion**, Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2009, MoOR):

$$\mathfrak{F}_t = \mathfrak{G}_t \vee \sigma(\{\tau \leq s; s \leq t\}).$$

- **Guo and Zeng (2008, AAP)**, any filtration \mathfrak{F} that satisfies:

$$\mathfrak{G}_t \cap \{t < \tau\} = \mathfrak{F}_t \cap \{t < \tau\}, \text{ for all } t \geq 0.$$

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,
- ▶ Existence and calculation of the intensity process for more general processes, such as:

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,
- ▶ Existence and calculation of the intensity process for more general processes, such as:
 - ▶ Brownian motion,

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,
- ▶ Existence and calculation of the intensity process for more general processes, such as:
 - ▶ Brownian motion,
 - ▶ (homogeneous) compound Poisson,

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,
- ▶ Existence and calculation of the intensity process for more general processes, such as:
 - ▶ Brownian motion,
 - ▶ (homogeneous) compound Poisson,
 - ▶ perturbed compound Poisson,

Further topics

- ▶ Interpretation of the intensity process,
- ▶ Existence and calculation of the intensity process for more general processes, such as:
 - ▶ Brownian motion,
 - ▶ (homogeneous) compound Poisson,
 - ▶ perturbed compound Poisson,
 - ▶ some Lévy processes.

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,
- ▶ Utility maximization,

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,
- ▶ Utility maximization,
- ▶ Quadratic hedging:

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,
- ▶ Utility maximization,
- ▶ Quadratic hedging:
 - ▶ Mean-variance hedging,

2. Credit risk under under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,
- ▶ Utility maximization,
- ▶ Quadratic hedging:
 - ▶ Mean-variance hedging,
 - ▶ Local risk–minimization hedging.

2. Credit risk under jumps processes

2.1 Introduction

Hedging methods: Some common ways to hedge against the risk of securities are

- ▶ Super hedging,
- ▶ Utility maximization,
- ▶ Quadratic hedging:
 - ▶ Mean-variance hedging,
 - ▶ Local risk-minimization hedging.

We use local risk-minimization approach to analyze the risk of defaultable claims.

Previous work

Normally, risk management models work under at least one of the following conditions:

- ▶ The underlying process is a (local) martingale,

Previous work

Normally, risk management models work under at least one of the following conditions:

- ▶ The underlying process is a (local) martingale,
- ▶ The underlying process has continuous sample paths,

Previous work

Normally, risk management models work under at least one of the following conditions:

- ▶ The underlying process is a (local) martingale,
- ▶ The underlying process has continuous sample paths,
- ▶ The contingent claim is not path dependent,

Previous work

Normally, risk management models work under at least one of the following conditions:

- ▶ The underlying process is a (local) martingale,
- ▶ The underlying process has continuous sample paths,
- ▶ The contingent claim is not path dependent,
- ▶ The Girsanov's theorem is applicable (MELMM Method).

We relax all these assumptions.

Defaultable security

- Suppose that uncertainty is modeled by a probability space $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P}, \mathfrak{F}_t)$.

Defaultable security

- ▶ Suppose that uncertainty is modeled by a probability space $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P}, \mathfrak{F}_t)$.
- ▶ The market is composed of
 - ▶ the risky asset $X = (X_t)_{0 \leq t < \infty}$,
 - ▶ and a risk-free one.

Defaultable security

- ▶ Suppose that uncertainty is modeled by a probability space $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P}, \mathfrak{F}_t)$.
- ▶ The market is composed of
 - ▶ the risky asset $X = (X_t)_{0 \leq t < \infty}$,
 - ▶ and a risk-free one.
- ▶ We study financial products with payoffs in the form of

$$F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}},$$

where $\tau = \inf\{t : X_t < 0\}$, $F : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ a convex function, and $T > 0$ is the maturity or expiration of the security.

- Assume that the process X is a finite variation Lévy process with non-negative drift

$$X_t = u + \mu t + \int_0^t \int_{\mathbb{R}-\{0\}} x J_X(ds \times dx), \quad t \geq 0.$$

- ▶ Assume that the process X is a finite variation Lévy process with non-negative drift

$$X_t = u + \mu t + \int_0^t \int_{\mathbb{R}-\{0\}} x J_X(ds \times dx), \quad t \geq 0.$$

- ▶ There are no restrictions on the probability measure.

- ▶ Assume that the process X is a finite variation Lévy process with non-negative drift

$$X_t = u + \mu t + \int_0^t \int_{\mathbb{R}-\{0\}} x J_X(ds \times dx), \quad t \geq 0.$$

- ▶ There are no restrictions on the probability measure.
- ▶ The usual convenient assumptions are made:
 - ▶ We suppose that all prices are discounted, and therefore the price of the risk-free asset is 1 at all times.

- ▶ Assume that the process X is a finite variation Lévy process with non-negative drift

$$X_t = u + \mu t + \int_0^t \int_{\mathbb{R}-\{0\}} x J_X(ds \times dx), \quad t \geq 0.$$

- ▶ There are no restrictions on the probability measure.
- ▶ The usual convenient assumptions are made:
 - ▶ We suppose that all prices are discounted, and therefore the price of the risk-free asset is 1 at all times.
 - ▶ Finally, the market is frictionless, and there is no arbitrage.

Objectives

The questions of interest are:

- ▶ Given a payoff $F(X_T)$ as above, how can one manage the riskiness of the defaultable security $F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}}$.

Objectives

The questions of interest are:

- ▶ Given a payoff $F(X_T)$ as above, how can one manage the riskiness of the defaultable security $F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}}$.
- ▶ The second question is if it is possible to design a customized payoff $F(X_T)$ specifically, that makes the product $F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}}$ completely risk free.

Itô's formula or Dynkin's formula

- By Dynkin's formula $f(t, X_t) - \int_0^t \mathcal{A}f(s, X_s)ds$ is a martingale for a $C^{1,2}$ function $f = f(t, x)$ where

$$\mathcal{A}f(s, x) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial s}(s, x) + \mu \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(s, x) + \int_{\mathbb{R}} (f(s, x+y) - f(s, x)) \nu(dy)$$

The compensator of $(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}})_{(t \geq 0)}$

Theorem: Assume that X is a bounded variation Lévy process. Let $f : [0, \infty) \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a $C^{1,2}$ function. Then under some integrability conditions, the process

$$\left(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} - \int_0^t \mathfrak{A}f(s, X_s)1_{\{\tau > s\}} ds \right)_{t \geq 0},$$

is an \mathfrak{F}^X -martingale, where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{A}f(s, x) = & \frac{\partial f}{\partial s}(s, x) + \mu \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(s, x) - \int_{-\infty}^{-x} f(s, x + y) \nu(dy) \\ & + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (f(s, x + y) - f(s, x)) \nu(dy). \end{aligned}$$

Application in martingale theory

$$\blacktriangleright f(t \wedge \tau, X_{t \wedge \tau}) = f(\tau, X_\tau)1_{\{\tau \leq t\}} + f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}}.$$

Application in martingale theory

- ▶ $f(t \wedge \tau, X_{t \wedge \tau}) = f(\tau, X_\tau)1_{\{\tau \leq t\}} + f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}}.$
- ▶ $\left(f(\tau, X_\tau)1_{\{\tau \leq t\}} - \int_0^{t \wedge \tau} \left(\int_{-\infty}^{-X_s} f(s, X_s + u) \nu(du) \right) ds \right)_{t \geq 0}$
is a martingale.

Application in martingale theory

- ▶ $f(t \wedge \tau, X_{t \wedge \tau}) = f(\tau, X_\tau)1_{\{\tau \leq t\}} + f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}}.$
- ▶ $\left(f(\tau, X_\tau)1_{\{\tau \leq t\}} - \int_0^{t \wedge \tau} \left(\int_{-\infty}^{-X_s} f(s, X_s + u) \nu(du) \right) ds \right)_{t \geq 0}$
is a martingale.
- ▶ $f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} - \int_0^{t \wedge \tau} \mathfrak{A}f(s, X_s) ds$ is a martingale.

2.3 Locally risk minimization hedging

Definition: For an L^2 -strategy θ , a small perturbation Δ , and a partition P of $[0, T]$, we set

$$r^P(\theta, \Delta) = \sum \frac{R_{t_i}(\theta + \Delta|_{(t_i, t_{i+1}]}) - R_{t_i}(\theta)}{\mathbb{E}[\langle M \rangle_{t_{i+1}} - \langle M \rangle_{t_i} | \mathfrak{F}_{t_i}]} 1_{(t_i, t_{i+1}]}$$

Then θ is called locally risk-minimizing if

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} r^{P_n}(\theta, \Delta) \geq 0, \quad (\mathbb{P} \times \langle M \rangle) - \text{a.e. on } \Omega \times [0, T],$$

for every small perturbation Δ and every increasing sequence P_n of partitions tending to the identity; see Schweizer (1999, HUB).

Pseudo-local risk-minimization

Definition: Let

$$V(\theta) = \phi X + \eta,$$

$$C_t(\theta) = V_t(\theta) - \int_0^t \phi_u dX_u,$$


and $\mathcal{H} \in L^2(\mathfrak{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$ is a contingent claim. An L^2 -strategy $\theta = (\phi, \eta)$ with $V_T(\theta) = \mathcal{H} \mathbb{P} - a.s.$ is called pseudo-locally risk-minimizing or pseudo-optimal for \mathcal{H} if $C(\theta)$ (the cost process) is a martingale, strongly orthogonal to the martingale part of X , see Schweizer, M.(1999, HUB).

Pseudo-local risk-minimization

—————→ $\mathcal{H} \in L^2(\mathfrak{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$

- - - - -→ L_T

- - - - -→ $\int_0^T \phi_s dX_s$



PIDE

Remark: Given a convex function $F = F(x)$, it is assumed that there is a $C^{1,2}$ function $f = f(t, x)$ that is the solution of the following PIDE

$$\mathfrak{A}f(t, x) = \frac{(\mathfrak{A}K(t, x) - x\mathfrak{A}f(t, x) - \beta f(t, x))}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} y^2 v(dy)} \beta, \text{ for all } 0 \leq t \leq T,$$

and

$$f(T, x) = F(x), \text{ for all real numbers } x,$$

where $K(t, x) = xf(t, x)$ and $\beta = \mu + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} y v(dy)$.

Theorem: Under the appropriate assumptions including the previous remark, there is an L^2 -strategy $\phi = (\theta, \eta)$ as follows. The number of risky assets for the hedging process is given by the process $\theta = (\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$, where

$$\theta_t = \frac{(\mathbb{Q}K(t, X_t) - X_t \mathbb{Q}f(t, X_t) - \beta f(t, X_t))}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} y^2 \nu(dy)} 1_{\{\tau > t\}}.$$

Hedging error

The hedging error L belongs to \mathcal{M}_0^2 . It is strongly orthogonal to M and given by

$$L_t = f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} - f(0, X_0) - \int_0^t \theta_s dX_s, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T.$$

The value process of the portfolio is equal to

$$V_t(\theta) = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^t \theta_s dX_s + L_t, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T,$$

the number of the risk-free assets is

$$\eta_t = V_t(\theta) - \theta_t X_t, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T,$$

and finally the cost process is provided by

$$C_t = f(0, X_0) + L_t, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T.$$

Example 2.1: $F(x) = 1$, exponential jump sizes

- ▶ Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$, for $\mu > 0$,
– $Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, and the process X a martingale.

Example 2.1: $F(x) = 1$, exponential jump sizes

- ▶ Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$, for $\mu > 0$,
– $Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, and the process X a martingale.
- ▶ Consider a defaultable zero-coupon bond that pays 1 unit if there is no default, i.e. $F(x) = 1$ for all x .

Example 2.1: $F(x) = 1$, exponential jump sizes

- Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$, for $\mu > 0$,
 $-Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, and the process X a martingale.
- Consider a defaultable zero-coupon bond that pays 1 unit if there is no default, i.e. $F(x) = 1$ for all x .
- The number of risky assets of the hedging strategy is:

$$\theta_s = \frac{\left(\int_{-X_s}^{\infty} y f(s, X_s + y) F_Y(dy) - \mathbb{E}[Y_1] f(s, X_s) \right) 1_{\{\tau > s\}}}{\mathbb{E}[Y_1^2]},$$


where $f = f(t, x)$ satisfies the following PIDE

$$\mathfrak{A}f(t, x) = 0, \text{ for all } 0 \leq t \leq T \text{ and all } x \in \mathbb{R},$$

$$f(T, x) = 1, \text{ for all } x \in \mathbb{R}.$$


Example 2.1: $F(x) = 1$, exponential jump sizes

The graph of $f = f(t, x)$ on $[0, 2] \times [0, 0.4]$ is given for $\mu = 0.1$, $\delta = 100$, $\lambda = 10$, and $T = 2$.





Example 2.1: $F(x) = 1$, exponential jump sizes

The function $f = f(t; x)$ can also be estimated numerically by simulation (for the same parameters as above).




Example 2.2: $F(x) = 1$, gamma jump sizes



$$\alpha = 5 \text{ and } \beta = 0.002 \quad \alpha = 0.5 \text{ and } \beta = 0.02$$

Perfect defaultable security



Here the curvy line is representing a risk-free product of the type of $G(X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}}$.

Perfect defaultable security

Lemma: Assume that (f, F) satisfies the following conditions

$$\mathfrak{A}f(t, x) = 0,$$

$$\mathcal{L}f(t, x) = 0,$$

$$f(T, x) = F(x),$$

then the product $F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}}$ is risk-free,

Perfect defaultable security

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{A}f(t, x) = & \mu \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(t, x) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial t}(t, x) \\ & + \lambda \int_{-x}^{\infty} f(t, x + u) \mathbb{P}[Y_1 \in du] - \lambda f(t, x), \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}f(t, x) = & \mathfrak{A}f(t, x)^2 \\ & - \lambda \frac{\left(\int_{-x}^{\infty} y f(s, x + y) \mathbb{P}[Y_1 \in dy] - \mathbb{E}[Y_1] f(s, x) \right)^2}{\mathbb{E}[Y_1^2]}. \end{aligned}$$

Use of risk measures

Assume that $F = F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}}$ is a risk free defaultable security. Then the riskiness of the defaultable security $\mathcal{H}1_{\{\tau > T\}}$ can be measured by

$$CD_{\rho}(\mathcal{H}1_{\{\tau > T\}}) = \rho(G - \mathcal{H}),$$

where ρ is a risk measure.

Application to finite time ruin probabilities

Proposition: Under appropriate conditions we have the following decompositions:

$$1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dX_s + L_T,$$

Application to finite time ruin probabilities

Proposition: Under appropriate conditions we have the following decompositions:

$$1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dX_s + L_T,$$

$$1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dM_s + L_T,$$

Application to finite time ruin probabilities

Proposition: Under appropriate conditions we have the following decompositions:

$$1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dX_s + L_T,$$

$$1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dM_s + L_T,$$

$$F(X_T)1_{\{\tau > T\}} = f(0, X_0) + \int_0^T \theta_{s-} dM_s + L_T.$$

Finite time ruin probabilities

Example 2.3: Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$ and $F(x) = 1 - \frac{\lambda}{\mu\delta} e^{(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} - \delta)x}$, then

$$F(X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} = F(u) + \int_0^t \theta_{s-} dM_s + L_t,$$

Finite time ruin probabilities

Example 2.3: Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$ and $F(x) = 1 - \frac{\lambda}{\mu\delta} e^{(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} - \delta)x}$, then

$$F(X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} = F(u) + \int_0^t \theta_s^- dM_s + L_t,$$

$$\theta_s = \frac{\left(\int_{-X_s}^{\infty} yg(X_s + y)F_Y(dy) - \mathbb{E}[Y_1]g(X_s) \right) 1_{\{\tau > s\}}}{\mathbb{E}[Y_1^2]}.$$

Finite time ruin probabilities

Example 2.3: Assume that $X_t = u + \mu t + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} Y_j$ and $F(x) = 1 - \frac{\lambda}{\mu\delta} e^{(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} - \delta)x}$, then

$$F(X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}} = F(u) + \int_0^t \theta_{s-} dM_s + L_t,$$

$$\theta_s = \frac{\left(\int_{-X_s}^{\infty} yg(X_s + y)F_Y(dy) - \mathbb{E}[Y_1]g(X_s) \right) 1_{\{\tau > s\}}}{\mathbb{E}[Y_1^2]}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau > t) - \frac{\lambda}{\mu\delta} \mathbb{E}[e^{(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} - \delta)X_t} 1_{\{\tau > t\}}] = F(u).$$

Examples 2.3-2.4: finite time ruin probabilities

- ▶ Let $-Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, for $\lambda = 0.2$, $\delta = 0.02$, $u = 10$, and $\mu = 1$. Then $\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq 1) \approx 0.1499320558$, compared to the exact value 0.1499305134.

Examples 2.3-2.4: finite time ruin probabilities

- ▶ Let $-Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, for $\lambda = 0.2$, $\delta = 0.02$, $u = 10$, and $\mu = 1$. Then $\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq 1) \approx 0.1499320558$, compared to the exact value 0.1499305134.
- ▶ If $-Y_1 \sim \text{gamma}(5, 10)$, for $\lambda = 0.2$, $u = 10$, and $\mu = 1$. Then $\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq 1) \approx 0.181257660$.

Examples 2.3-2.4: finite time ruin probabilities

- ▶ Let $-Y_1 \sim \text{exponential}(\delta)$, for $\lambda = 0.2$, $\delta = 0.02$, $u = 10$, and $\mu = 1$. Then $\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq 1) \approx 0.1499320558$, compared to the exact value 0.1499305134.
- ▶ If $-Y_1 \sim \text{gamma}(5, 10)$, for $\lambda = 0.2$, $u = 10$, and $\mu = 1$. Then $\mathbb{P}(\tau \leq 1) \approx 0.181257660$.
- ▶ In both cases above the upper bound for the error is 1.8%

In summary

- ▶ The compensator of the process $(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}})_{(t \geq 0)}$ is obtained,

In summary

- ▶ The compensator of the process $(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}})_{(t \geq 0)}$ is obtained,
- ▶ The locally risk–minimization approach is carried out for defaultable claims under finite variation Lévy processes,

In summary

- ▶ The compensator of the process $(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}})_{(t \geq 0)}$ is obtained,
- ▶ The locally risk–minimization approach is carried out for defaultable claims under finite variation Lévy processes,
- ▶ The hedging strategies and pricing rules were calculated under a physical measure.

In summary

- ▶ The compensator of the process $(f(t, X_t)1_{\{\tau > t\}})_{(t \geq 0)}$ is obtained,
- ▶ The locally risk–minimization approach is carried out for defaultable claims under finite variation Lévy processes,
- ▶ The hedging strategies and pricing rules were calculated under a physical measure.
- ▶ The analysis does not use the MELMM method to obtain the strategies. However, the final solution is based on the solution of a PIDE.



1st European Actuarial Journal (EAJ) Conference

Organized by Swiss Association of Actuaries (SAA)
and University of Lausanne

6-7 September 2012

University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Scientific Committee

Hansjörg Albrecher, co-chair (U of Lausanne)
 Mario Wüthrich, co-chair (ETH Zurich)
 Griselda Deelstra (Bruxelles)
 Holger Drees (Hamburg)
 Alfredo Egido dos Reis (Lisbon)
 José Garrido, (Concordia, Montreal)
 Christian Hipp (Karlsruhe)
 Ralf Korn (Kaiserslautern)
 Stéphane Loisel (Lyon)
 Thomas Mikosch (Copenhagen)
 Ermanno Pitacco (Trieste)

Invited Speakers

Hans Bühlmann (ETH Zurich)
 Thomas Möller (PFA Pension)
 Michel Dacorogna (SCOR)
 Antoon Pelsser (Maastricht University)
 Alex McNeil (Heniot-Watt University)

Organizing Committee

François Dufresne, chair (U of Lausanne)
 Hanspeter Tobler, President of SAA
 Séverine Gaille (U of Lausanne)
 Erkelejd Hashorva (U of Lausanne)
 Stefan Thonhauser (U of Lausanne)

Parallel Sessions

Life and Pension Insurance
 Mathematics
 Non-Life Insurance
 Mathematics
 Risk Management and Solvency
 2
 Financial Mathematics with
 Applications in Insurance
 Economics of Insurance

Contributed Talks

Deadline for submitting an abstract:

30 April 2012



A web site with more information, a conference management system, and an online registration + payment system is being prepared.

Please send an e-mail message to info@eaj2012.org if you wish to be informed when that site is published.

3. Credit risk models with risk measures

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Arbitrage opportunities:

- ▶ Arbitrage opportunities can arise from over– or under–estimation of the financial derivatives underlying risk.

3. Credit risk models with risk measures

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Arbitrage opportunities:

- ▶ Arbitrage opportunities can arise from over– or under–estimation of the financial derivatives underlying risk.
- ▶ We investigate the type of the arbitrage that comes from the (intuitive) properties of risk measures.

3. Credit risk models with risk measures

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Arbitrage opportunities:

- ▶ Arbitrage opportunities can arise from over– or under–estimation of the financial derivatives underlying risk.
- ▶ We investigate the type of the arbitrage that comes from the (intuitive) properties of risk measures. In other words, under a specific risk measure, if the risk of a portfolio is less than or equal to 0, then a possible positive income of the portfolio is considered as an arbitrage income.

Portfolio 1

Is this portfolio **consistent**?

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1,010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	101,000	909

Portfolios 2 and 3

Now, which of the following portfolios seems consistent?

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1,010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	1
Cash flow 2	1,010	909

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1,010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	1,010	909

A five-bond portfolio

Dates	Bond 1	Bond 2	Bond 3	Bond 4	Bond 5
7-Dec-2010	98.77	99.96	99.00	112.70	114.35
1-Jan-2011	0	0	0	5	5.4
1-May-2011	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-May-2011	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-July-2011	0	0	0	5	5.4
15-July-2011	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-Nov-2011	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-Nov-2011	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-Jan-2012	0	0	0	5	5.4
15-Jan-2012	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-May-2012	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-May-2012	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-July-2012	0	0	0	5	5.4
15-July-2012	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-Nov-2012	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-Nov-2012	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-Jan-2013	0	0	0	5	5.4
15-Jan-2013	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-May-2013	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-May-2013	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-July-2013	0	0	0	5	5.4
15-July-2013	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-Nov-2013	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-Nov-2013	0	0	1.5	0	0
1-Jan-2014	0	0	0	5+100	5.4+100
15-Jan-2014	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-May-2014	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-May-2014	0	0	1.5	0	0
15-July-2014	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-Nov-2014	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-Nov-2014	0	0	1.5	0	0
15-Jan-2015	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-May-2015	1.375	0	0	0	0
15-May-2015	0	0	1.5	0	0
15-July-2015	0	2.6	0	0	0
1-Nov-2015	100+1.375	0	0	0	0
15-Nov-2015	0	0	1.5+100	0	0
15-Jan-2016	0	2.6+100	0	0	0
1-May-2016	0	2.6+100	0	0	0

Corporate bond 1

COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO MTNS BE

As of 7-Dec-2010

OVERVIEW

Price:	98.77
Coupon(%):	1.375
Maturity Date:	1-Nov-2015
Yield to Maturity(%):	1.639
Current Yield(%):	1.392
Fitch Rating:	AA
Coupon Payment Frequency:	Semi-Annual
First Coupon Date:	1-May-2011
Type:	Corporate
Callable:	No

OFFERING INFORMATION

Quantity Available:	1240
Minimum Trade Qty:	1
Dated Date:	3-Nov-2010
Settlement Date:	13-Dec-2010

(Source: Yahoo Finance: <http://screen.yahoo.com/bonds.html>)

1. Credit risk models, a review
2. Credit risk under under jumps
3. Credit risk models with risk measures

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Inconsistencies and market integration

3.3 Credit risk measures

Corporate bonds 2 and 3

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO

As of 7-Dec-2010

OVERVIEW

Price:	99.96
Coupon(%):	2.600
Maturity Date:	15-Jan-2016
Yield to Maturity(%):	2.607
Current Yield(%):	2.601
Fitch Rating:	AA
Coupon Payment Frequency:	Semi-Annual
First Coupon Date:	15-Jul-2011
Type:	Corporate
Callable:	No

OFFERING INFORMATION

Quantity Available:	300
Minimum Trade Qty:	1
Dated Date:	18-Nov-2010
Settlement Date:	13-Dec-2010

COCA COLA CO

As of 7-Dec-2010

OVERVIEW

Price:	99.00
Coupon(%):	1.500
Maturity Date:	15-Nov-2015
Yield to Maturity(%):	1.714
Current Yield(%):	1.515
Fitch Rating:	AA
Coupon Payment Frequency:	Semi-Annual
First Coupon Date:	15-May-2011
Type:	Corporate
Callable:	No

OFFERING INFORMATION

Quantity Available:	175
Minimum Trade Qty:	1
Dated Date:	15-Nov-2010
Settlement Date:	13-Dec-2010

(Source: Yahoo Finance: <http://screen.yahoo.com/bonds.html>)

Municipal bonds 4 and 5

CHICAGO ILL GO BDS

As of 7-Dec-2010

OVERVIEW

State:	Illinois
Price:	112.70
Coupon(%):	5.000
Maturity Date:	1-Jan-2014
Yield to Maturity(%):	0.780
Current Yield(%):	4.437
Fitch Rating:	AA
Coupon Payment Frequency:	Semi-Annual
First Coupon Date:	1-Jan-2008
Callable:	No

BOND PROFILE

Type:	Municipal
Insured:	Yes
Alternative Minimum Tax:	No

CHICAGO ILL TAXABLE GO BONDS

As of 7-Dec-2010

OVERVIEW

State:	Illinois
Price:	114.35
Coupon(%):	5.400
Maturity Date:	1-Jan-2014
Yield to Maturity(%):	0.644
Current Yield(%):	4.722
Fitch Rating:	AA
Coupon Payment Frequency:	Semi-Annual
First Coupon Date:	1-Jan-2005
Callable:	No

BOND PROFILE

Type:	Municipal
Insured:	Yes
Alternative Minimum Tax:	No

(Source: Yahoo Finance: <http://screen.yahoo.com/bonds.html>)

Risk Measures

Assume that uncertainty is modeled by $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P})$.

Risk Measures

Assume that uncertainty is modeled by $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P})$.

A random variable $X : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ represents the investment loss or gain over a period of time.

Risk Measures

Assume that uncertainty is modeled by $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P})$.

A random variable $X : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ represents the investment loss or gain over a period of time.

Definition: A risk measure is a function $\rho : \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where \mathfrak{R} is the set of all real valued random variables.

Risk Measures

Assume that uncertainty is modeled by $(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, \mathbb{P})$.

A random variable $X : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ represents the investment loss or gain over a period of time.

Definition: A risk measure is a function $\rho : \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where \mathfrak{R} is the set of all real valued random variables.

$\rho(X)$ measures the risk associated to the random variable X .

Coherent risk measures

Assume that random variables X and Y represent the gains on two different investments.

Coherent risk measures

Assume that random variables X and Y represent the gains on two different investments.

A risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies the following properties:

- **Sub-additivity:** $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$, for all $X, Y \in \mathfrak{R}$,

Coherent risk measures

Assume that random variables X and Y represent the gains on two different investments.

A risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies the following properties:

- ▶ **Sub-additivity:** $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$, for all $X, Y \in \mathfrak{R}$,
- ▶ **Positive homogeneity:** $\rho(\lambda X) = \lambda \rho(X)$, for all $\lambda \geq 0$ and $X \in \mathfrak{R}$,

Coherent risk measures

Assume that random variables X and Y represent the gains on two different investments.

A risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies the following properties:

- ▶ **Sub-additivity:** $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$, for all $X, Y \in \mathfrak{R}$,
- ▶ **Positive homogeneity:** $\rho(\lambda X) = \lambda \rho(X)$, for all $\lambda \geq 0$ and $X \in \mathfrak{R}$,
- ▶ **Translation invariance:** $\rho(X + a) = \rho(X) - a$, for all $X \in \mathfrak{R}$ and all $a \in \mathbb{R}$,

Coherent risk measures

Assume that random variables X and Y represent the gains on two different investments.

A risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies the following properties:

- ▶ **Sub-additivity:** $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$, for all $X, Y \in \mathfrak{R}$,
- ▶ **Positive homogeneity:** $\rho(\lambda X) = \lambda \rho(X)$, for all $\lambda \geq 0$ and $X \in \mathfrak{R}$,
- ▶ **Translation invariance:** $\rho(X + a) = \rho(X) - a$, for all $X \in \mathfrak{R}$ and all $a \in \mathbb{R}$,
- ▶ **Monotonicity:** if $X \leq Y$ then $\rho(Y) \leq \rho(X)$.

Other types of risk measures

Among the many other types of risk measures are:

- ▶ **Expectation bounded risk measures:** Rockafellar et al. (2006, F&S).

Other types of risk measures

Among the many other types of risk measures are:

- ▶ **Expectation bounded risk measures:** Rockafellar et al. (2006, F&S).
- ▶ **Deviation risk measures:** Rockafellar et al. (2006, J&S).
- ▶ **Distortion risk measures:** Wang (2000, JRI).

Examples of risk measures

- ▶ Value-at-risk of X for $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is given by

$$\text{VaR}_\alpha(X) = -\inf\{z : F_X(z) > \alpha\}.$$

Examples of risk measures

- ▶ **Value-at-risk** of X for $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is given by

$$\text{VaR}_\alpha(X) = -\inf\{z : F_X(z) > \alpha\}.$$

- ▶ The **conditional value-at-risk** is given by

$$\text{CVaR}_\alpha(X) = -\mathbb{E}[X | X \leq -\text{VaR}_\alpha(X)],$$

when F_X is continuous at $-\text{VaR}_\alpha(X)$.

$A = [a_{ij}]$ is an $m \times n$ matrix representing n bonds with possible future cash flows at times t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m ,

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
 & B_1 & B_2 & \cdots & B_n \\
 & \downarrow & \downarrow & \cdots & \downarrow \\
 t_1 \rightarrow & a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1n} \\
 t_2 \rightarrow & a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2n} \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 t_m \rightarrow & a_{m1} & a_{m2} & \cdots & a_{mn}
 \end{array}$$

$A = [a_{ij}]$ is an $m \times n$ matrix representing n bonds with possible future cash flows at times t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m ,

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
 & B_1 & B_2 & \cdots & B_n \\
 & \downarrow & \downarrow & \cdots & \downarrow \\
 t_1 \rightarrow & a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1n} \\
 t_2 \rightarrow & a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2n} \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 t_m \rightarrow & a_{m1} & a_{m2} & \cdots & a_{mn}
 \end{array}$$

$T = t_m$ represents the final date of the cash flow.

$A = [a_{ij}]$ is an $m \times n$ matrix representing n bonds with possible future cash flows at times t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m ,

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
 & B_1 & B_2 & \cdots & B_n \\
 & \downarrow & \downarrow & \cdots & \downarrow \\
 t_1 \rightarrow & a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1n} \\
 t_2 \rightarrow & a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2n} \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & & \cdot \\
 t_m \rightarrow & a_{m1} & a_{m2} & \cdots & a_{mn}
 \end{array}$$

$T = t_m$ represents the final date of the cash flow.

Each vector $\bar{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ represents a portfolio consisting x_1 units of B_1 , x_2 units of B_2, \dots , x_n units of B_n .

Accumulated Wealth Function

We consider the accumulated wealth function $\Pi_T : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \Pi$ where

$$\Pi = \{\Pi_T(\bar{x}) : \bar{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m\},$$

and $\bar{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$ is a vector in \mathbb{R}^m .

Accumulated Wealth Function

We consider the accumulated wealth function $\Pi_T : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \Pi$ where

$$\Pi = \{\Pi_T(\bar{x}) : \bar{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m\},$$

and $\bar{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$ is a vector in \mathbb{R}^m .

It is assumed that $\Pi \subset L^2(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, P)$, or in other words $\mathbb{E}[(\Pi_T(\bar{x}))^2] < \infty$.

Accumulated Wealth Function

We consider the accumulated wealth function $\Pi_T : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \Pi$ where

$$\Pi = \{\Pi_T(\bar{x}) : \bar{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m\},$$

and $\bar{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$ is a vector in \mathbb{R}^m .

It is assumed that $\Pi \subset L^2(\Omega, \mathfrak{F}, P)$, or in other words $\mathbb{E}[(\Pi_T(\bar{x}))^2] < \infty$.

Π_T is a linear function.

Assume that $\rho : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is any risk measure that satisfies the conditions of sub-additivity, $\rho(x + y) \leq \rho(x) + \rho(y)$ and positive homogeneity, $\rho(tx) = t\rho(x)$ for every $t \geq 0$ and $x, y \in \Pi$.

Assume that $\rho : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is any risk measure that satisfies the conditions of sub-additivity, $\rho(x + y) \leq \rho(x) + \rho(y)$ and positive homogeneity, $\rho(tx) = t\rho(x)$ for every $t \geq 0$ and $x, y \in \Pi$.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{R}^m & \xrightarrow{\Pi_T} & \Pi \\ & & \downarrow \rho \\ & & \mathbb{R} \end{array}$$

Assume that $\rho : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is any risk measure that satisfies the conditions of sub-additivity, $\rho(x + y) \leq \rho(x) + \rho(y)$ and positive homogeneity, $\rho(tx) = t\rho(x)$ for every $t \geq 0$ and $x, y \in \Pi$.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{R}^m & \xrightarrow{\Pi_T} & \Pi \\ & & \downarrow \rho \\ & & \mathbb{R} \end{array}$$

The composition of ρ and Π_T , denoted $\bar{\rho} = \rho \circ \Pi_T$, defines a risk measure on \mathbb{R}^m into \mathbb{R} that is sub-additive and positively homogeneous.

Representation theorem

Assume that $\bar{\rho} : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is as above, then

$$\bar{\rho}(\bar{y}) = \max\{-\bar{y} \cdot \bar{z} : \bar{z} \in \Delta_{\bar{\rho}}\},$$

where

$$\Delta_{\bar{\rho}} = \{\bar{z} \in \mathbb{R}^m; \quad \bar{\rho}(\bar{y}) \geq -\bar{y} \cdot \bar{z} \quad , \forall \quad \bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^m\},$$

and $\bar{y} \cdot \bar{z}$ is the usual inner product on \mathbb{R}^m .

Definition of ρ -arbitrage

The portfolio \bar{x} is said to be a ρ -arbitrage portfolio if:

► $\bar{p} \cdot \bar{x} < 0$

Definition of ρ -arbitrage

The portfolio \bar{x} is said to be a ρ -arbitrage portfolio if:

- ▶ $\bar{p} \cdot \bar{x} < 0$
- ▶ $\bar{\rho}(\sum_{j=1}^n x_j a_{1j}, \dots, \sum_{j=1}^n x_j a_{mj}) \leq 0$ or, equivalently,
 $\bar{\rho}(\bar{x} \cdot \bar{b}_1, \dots, \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b}_m) \leq 0$ where $\bar{b}_i = (a_{i1}, \dots, a_{in}) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the row i of matrix A for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$.

3.2 Inconsistencies and market integration

Definition: A (bond) market is said to be free of inconsistencies, if it does not provide any ρ -arbitrage opportunities to investors.

Measuring ρ -arbitrage

To measure inconsistencies the following optimization problem is proposed:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Maximize } -\bar{p} \cdot \bar{x}, \\ & \text{such that } \bar{\rho}(\bar{x} \cdot \bar{a}_1, \dots, \bar{x} \cdot \bar{a}_m) \leq 0, \\ & \bar{x} + \bar{h} \geq 0, \\ & \bar{h} \cdot \bar{p} \leq 1, \\ & \bar{h} \geq 0, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $(\bar{x}, \bar{h}) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times (\mathbb{R}^+ \cup \{0\})^n$ are the decision variables.

Existence of ρ -arbitrage

Lemma: Assume that θ^* is the optimal value of the primal problem above. Then the market is ρ -arbitrage free if and only if $\theta^* = 0$.

The dual problem

Theorem: Assume that the above primal problem is always finite, it reaches its optimal value, and so the optimal solutions always exist.

The dual problem

Theorem: Assume that the above primal problem is always finite, it reaches its optimal value, and so the optimal solutions always exist. Then the equivalent dual form of the primal problem is

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Minimize } \theta, \\ & \text{such that } p_j = \lambda_j + \alpha \bar{b}_j \cdot \bar{z}, \\ & \bar{\lambda} \leq \theta \bar{p}, \\ & \theta \geq 0, \bar{\lambda} \geq 0, \alpha \geq 0, \bar{z} \in \Delta_{\bar{p}}. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions

Theorem: (\bar{x}^*, \bar{h}^*) and $(\theta^*, \bar{\lambda}^*, \alpha^*, \bar{z}^*)$ solve problems (1), and (2) respectively, if and only if they satisfy the following K–K–T conditions:

$$p_j = \lambda_j^* + \alpha^* \bar{b}_j \cdot \bar{z}^*, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n,$$

$$\bar{\lambda}^* \leq \theta^* \bar{p},$$

$$\bar{x}^* \cdot (\bar{p} - \bar{\lambda}^*) = 0,$$

$$\bar{\lambda}^* \cdot (\bar{x}^* + \bar{h}^*) = 0,$$

$$\theta^* (\bar{h}^* \cdot \bar{p} - 1) = 0,$$

$$\bar{h}^* \geq 0, \quad \bar{h}^* \cdot \bar{p} \leq 1, \quad \bar{x}^* + \bar{h}^* \geq 0,$$

$$\theta^* \geq 0, \quad \bar{\lambda}^* \geq 0, \quad \bar{z}^* \in \Delta_{\bar{p}}, \quad \alpha^* \geq 0.$$

Existence of ρ -arbitrage

Theorem: There is no ρ -arbitrage in a portfolio if and only if there exists $(\bar{z}^*, \alpha^*) \in \Delta_{\bar{\rho}} \times \mathbb{R}^+$ such that for every j ,

$$p_j = \alpha^* \bar{z}^* \cdot \bar{b}_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n,$$

where $\bar{b}_j = (a_{1j}, a_{2j}, \dots, a_{mj})$ is the j 's column of matrix A .

Classical arbitrage

Corollary: Suppose that the solution set of the following system of equations is empty:

$$p_j = \alpha^* \bar{z}_* \cdot \bar{b}_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n,$$

where $\bar{b}_j = (a_{1j}, a_{2j}, \dots, a_{mj})$ is the j th column of matrix A .

Classical arbitrage

Corollary: Suppose that the solution set of the following system of equations is empty:

$$p_j = \alpha^* \bar{z}_* \cdot \bar{b}_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n,$$

where $\bar{b}_j = (a_{1j}, a_{2j}, \dots, a_{mj})$ is the j th column of matrix A . Then the existence of a classical arbitrage in the market is guaranteed.

Extension of the risk measurement

- ▶ So far, we have looked at maximizing the arbitrage income subject to some constraints.

Extension of the risk measurement

- ▶ So far, we have looked at maximizing the arbitrage income subject to some constraints.
- ▶ Another perspective is to maximize the arbitrage income and minimize the risk simultaneously.

Extension of the risk measurement

- ▶ So far, we have looked at maximizing the arbitrage income subject to some constraints.
- ▶ Another perspective is to maximize the arbitrage income and minimize the risk simultaneously. In other words, trying to maximize a vector objective function $(-\bar{p} \cdot \bar{x}, -\bar{\rho}(\bar{x} \cdot \bar{a}_1, \dots, \bar{x} \cdot \bar{a}_m))$.

Simple numerical example

Assume that changes in interest rates are modeled by

$$r = \begin{cases} r_1, & \text{with probability } 1 - q, \\ r_2, & \text{with probability } q, \end{cases}$$

Simple numerical example

Assume that changes in interest rates are modeled by

$$r = \begin{cases} r_1, & \text{with probability } 1 - q, \\ r_2, & \text{with probability } q, \end{cases}$$

that is $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$, $\mathbb{P}(\omega_1) = 1 - q$, $\mathbb{P}(\omega_2) = q$, and assume that $\rho = CVaR_\alpha$, with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Numerical example: Portfolio 2

- ▶ Assume that $q = 0.9$, $r_1 = 0.05$, $r_2 = 0.03$, and $\alpha = 0.05$.

Numerical example: Portfolio 2

- ▶ Assume that $q = 0.9$, $r_1 = 0.05$, $r_2 = 0.03$, and $\alpha = 0.05$.
- ▶ The portfolio consists of the 2 following bonds:

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	1
Cash flow 2	1010	909

Numerical example: Portfolio 2

For this portfolio the optimal value is approximately equal to $\theta^* = 0.00869$.

Numerical example: Portfolio 2

For this portfolio the optimal value is approximately equal to $\theta^* = 0.00869$.

- ▶ The solution of the primal problem is equal to $x_1^* \approx 0.00098$, $x_2^* \approx -0.0011$.

Numerical example: Portfolio 2

For this portfolio the optimal value is approximately equal to $\theta^* = 0.00869$.

- ▶ The solution of the primal problem is equal to $x_1^* \approx 0.00098$, $x_2^* \approx -0.0011$.
- ▶ The solution of the dual problem is equal to $\theta^* \approx 0.00869$, $\lambda_1^* \approx 0$, $\lambda_2^* \approx 7.8999$, $\alpha^* \approx 0.9901$, $\bar{z}_1^* \approx 1$, $\bar{z}_2^* \approx 0.9901$.


Numerical example: Portfolio 2

For this portfolio the optimal value is approximately equal to $\theta^* = 0.00869$.

- ▶ The solution of the primal problem is equal to $x_1^* \approx 0.00098$, $x_2^* \approx -0.0011$.
- ▶ The solution of the dual problem is equal to $\theta^* \approx 0.00869$, $\lambda_1^* \approx 0$, $\lambda_2^* \approx 7.8999$, $\alpha^* \approx 0.9901$, $\bar{z}_1^* \approx 1$, $\bar{z}_2^* \approx 0.9901$.
- ▶ The optimal solution is sensitive to changes in α , q , r_1 , and r_2 .

Sensitivity with respect to α

The following graph gives the optimal value θ^* as a function of α .



Empirical data

- ▶ When applying the model to real market data, the problem of determining the sub-gradient set $\Delta_{\bar{\rho}}$ can be difficult.

Empirical data

- ▶ When applying the model to real market data, the problem of determining the sub-gradient set $\Delta_{\bar{\rho}}$ can be difficult.
- ▶ A possible avenue is to use [risk statistics](#), defined in the next section.

Risk statistics

- ▶ Natural risk statistics,
- ▶ Coherent risk statistics,
- ▶ Law-invariant coherent risk statistics.

Numerical example: Portfolio 2 (revisited)

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	1
Cash flow 2	1010	909

Numerical example: Portfolio 2 (revisited)

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	1
Cash flow 2	1010	909

The result of the optimization problem here is 0 for all natural risk statistics, coherent risk statistics, and law-invariant coherent risk statistics under the maximal set Δ .

Numerical example: Portfolio 3

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	101000	909

Numerical example: Portfolio 3

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	101000	909

- Under the assumptions of the tree model, the optimal value is ≈ 0.99899874 .

Numerical example: Portfolio 3

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	101000	909

- ▶ Under the assumptions of the tree model, the optimal value is ≈ 0.99899874 .
- ▶ The optimal value under the above risk statistics is still zero.

Numerical example: Portfolio 3

	Bond 1	Bond 2
Price of the bonds	1010	908.9
Cash flow 1	10	9
Cash flow 2	101000	909

- ▶ Under the assumptions of the tree model, the optimal value is ≈ 0.99899874 .
- ▶ The optimal value under the above risk statistics is still zero.
- ▶ Can we conclude that natural risk measures cannot detect inconsistencies?

Using risk statistics

- ▶ The main problem with natural risk statistics and law-invariant coherent risk statistics is their permutation invariance. For example $\bar{\rho}(1, 0) = \bar{\rho}(0, 1)$.

Using risk statistics

- ▶ The main problem with natural risk statistics and law-invariant coherent risk statistics is their permutation invariance. For example $\bar{\rho}(1, 0) = \bar{\rho}(0, 1)$.
- ▶ In Heyde et al. (2007), they take data statically (i.e. at a fixed time), while we use data at different times.

3.3 Credit risk measures

Thank you for your
attention

Bibliography

Artzner, P., Delbaen, F. (1995) "Default risk insurance and incomplete markets", *Mathematical Finance*, **5**, 187-195.

Black, F., Cox, J.C. (1976) "Valuing corporate securities: some effects of bond indenture provisions", *Journal of Finance*, **31**, 351-367.

Duffie, D., Lando, D. (2001) "Term structures of credit spreads with incomplete accounting information", *Econometrica*, **69**(3), 633-664.

Duffie, D., Singleton, K.J. (1999) "Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds", *Review of Financial Studies*, **12**, 687-720.

Giesecke, K. (2006) "Default and information", *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, **30**, 2281-2303.

Bibliography (...continued)

Guo, X., Zeng, Y. (2008) “Intensity process and compensator: A new filtration expansion approach and the Jeulin–Yor formula”, *The Annals of Applied Probability*, **18**(1), 120–142.

Guo, X., Jarrow, R.A., Zeng Y. (2009) “Credit risk models with incomplete information”, *Mathematics of Operations Research*, **34**(2), 320–332.

Jarrow, R.A., Turnbull, S.M. (1995) “Pricing derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk” *Journal of Finance*, **50**(1), 53–86.

Jeanblanc, M., Lecom, Y. (2007) “Reduced form modelling for credit risk”, SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021545>

Bibliography (...end)

Okhrati, R., Balbás, A., Garrido, J. (2011) “Defaultable claims under finite variation Lévy processes”, *preprint*, submitted to *Stochastic Processes and their Applications*.

Rockafellar, R.T., Uryasev, S., Zabarankin, M. (2006) “Generalized deviations in risk analysis”, *Finance and Stochastics*, **10**, 51-74.

Schweizer, M. (1999) “A guided tour through quadratic hedging approaches”, *Humboldt Universitat Berlin*, **96**.

Wang, S.S. (2000) “A class of distortion operators for financial and insurance risks”, *Journal of Risk Insurance*, **6**, 7, 15-36.