Conference on Discrete Geometry and Optimization

## Toronto, September 201 I

## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in Social Choice Theory

Achill Schürmann<br>(University of Rostock)

arXiv:II09.I545

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## Symmetric Polyhedra

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Fire


Air


## Social Choice Theory

individual choices

collective choice

## Social Choice Theory

individual choices

collective choice

| a | b | c | b | a |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $>$ | $>$ | $>$ | $>$ | $>$ |  |
| b | c | a | c | c | $\bullet \bullet$ |
| $>$ | $>$ | $>$ | $>$ | $>$ |  |
| c | a | b | a | b |  |

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$a$
$>$
$b$
$>$
$c$

## Social Choice Theory

individual choices



## collective choice

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## Arrows Impossibility Theorem

Kenneth Arrow
(Nobel prize 1972)

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THM: There is no fair voting system.


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## Condorcet paradox

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Marquis de Condorcet
(1743-I793)

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THUS: There may be no "pairwise winner"! (Condorcet winner)

## Polyhedral Model

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- for three candidates $a, b$ and $c$, let
$n_{\mathrm{ab}}$ number of voters with choice $\mathrm{a}>\mathrm{b}>\mathrm{c}$
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## Counting Lattice Points

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## Counting Lattice Points

- Candidate a is a Condorcet winner if
(1) $\quad n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ca}}>n_{\mathrm{ba}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}} \quad$ (a beats b$)$
(2) and $n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ba}}>n_{\mathrm{ca}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}} \quad$ (a beats c$)$

That is: $\quad\left(n_{\mathrm{ab}}, n_{\mathrm{ac}}, n_{\mathrm{ba}}, n_{\mathrm{bc}}, n_{\mathrm{ca}}, n_{\mathrm{cb}}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^{6}$
is in the polyhedron
$P_{N}=\left\{n \in \mathbb{R}^{6} \mid N=\sum_{\mathrm{xy}} n_{x y}, n_{x y} \geq 0\right.$ and $\left.(1),(2)\right\}$

## Ehrhart theory

$$
\#\left(P_{N} \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right)=a_{d-1} N^{d-1}+\ldots+a_{1} N+a_{0}
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$\mathrm{Ex}: P_{1}=\operatorname{conv}\left\{e_{1}, \ldots, e_{d}\right\} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \#\left(P_{N} \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right)=\binom{N+d-1}{d-1}$


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- Parallelity of Approach discovered in 2006 (by Lepelley et al. and Wilson / Pritchard)



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\begin{aligned}
& 1 / 384 * N^{\wedge} 5 \\
+ & (-1 / 64 *\{(1 / 2 * N+0)\}+3 / 64) * N^{\wedge} 4 \\
+ & (-19 / 96 *\{(1 / 2 * N+0)\}+31 / 96) * N^{\wedge} 3 \\
+ & (-29 / 32 *\{(1 / 2 * N+0)\}+17 / 16) * N^{\wedge} 2 \\
+ & (-343 / 192 *\{(1 / 2 * N+0)\}+5 / 3) * N \\
+ & (-83 / 64 *\{(1 / 2 * N+0)\}+1)
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( Number of voting situations with N voters and candidate a as Condorcet winner )

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For large elections $(N \rightarrow \infty)$ :

$$
1-3 \frac{1 / 384}{1 / 120}=\frac{1}{16}=0.0625
$$

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( a beats b)
( a beats c)
( b wins plurality )

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Likeliness for large elections $(N \rightarrow \infty): \frac{16}{135}=0.1185 \ldots$

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\end{array}
$$

$$
\text { Likeliness for large elections }(N \rightarrow \infty): \frac{71}{576}=0.12326 \ldots
$$

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hardly any exact probabilitie

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IDEA: Reduce dimension by exploiting symmetry !

## Grouping of variables

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\begin{aligned}
& n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ca}}>n_{\mathrm{ba}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}} \\
& n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ba}}>n_{\mathrm{ca}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}} \\
& N=n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ba}}+n_{\mathrm{ca}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}}
\end{aligned}
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n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ca}}>n_{\mathrm{ba}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}}
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$$

$$
N=n_{\mathrm{ab}}+n_{\mathrm{ac}}+n_{\mathrm{ba}}+n_{\mathrm{ca}}+n_{\mathrm{bc}}+n_{\mathrm{cb}}
$$

$$
n_{\mathrm{a}}
$$

$$
n_{\mathrm{R}}
$$

## Grouping of variables



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$\left(n_{\mathrm{a}}, n_{\mathrm{ba}}, n_{\mathrm{ca}}, n_{\mathrm{R}}\right)$ describes $\left(n_{\mathrm{a}}+1\right)\left(n_{\mathrm{R}}+1\right)$ voting situations
(former lattice points)

## Grouping of variables



$$
n_{\mathrm{a}}
$$

$n_{\mathrm{R}}$
$\left(n_{\mathrm{a}}, n_{\mathrm{ba}}, n_{\mathrm{ca}}, n_{\mathrm{R}}\right)$ describes $\left(n_{\mathrm{a}}+1\right)\left(n_{\mathrm{R}}+1\right)$ voting situations
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THUS: the polytope decomposes into fibers of simplotopes (cross products of simplices)

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## Exploiting symmetry via integration

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$$
\operatorname{Prob}(N)=\frac{\left|L_{N} \cap P \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|}{\left|L_{N} \cap S \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|}
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## Exploiting symmetry via integration

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\operatorname{Prob}(N)=\frac{\left|L_{N} \cap P \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|}{\left|L_{N} \cap S \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|} \quad L_{N}=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{d}: \sum_{i} x_{i}=N\right\}
$$

$P, S$ homogeneous polyhedral cones

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$$

$$
=\frac{\sum_{n \in L_{N} \cap P \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}} 1}{\sum 1}
$$

$$
n \in L_{N} \cap S \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}
$$

## Exploiting symmetry via integration

$$
\operatorname{Prob}(N)=\frac{\left|L_{N} \cap P \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|}{\left|L_{N} \cap S \cap \mathbb{Z}^{d}\right|} \quad L_{N}=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{d}: \sum_{i} x_{i}=N\right\}
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$$


$\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \operatorname{Prob}(N)=\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\left|L_{1} \cap P \cap(\mathbb{Z} / N)^{d}\right|}{\left|L_{1} \cap S \cap(\mathbb{Z} / N)^{d}\right|}$

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$P, S$ homogeneous polyhedral cones


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$$

## Large elections with four candidates

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- No Condorcet winner exists (Condorcet paradox)

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William V. Gehrlein

In an email of Sep. 7th 201 I:
Your results particularly got my attention when I finally realized that you had obtained limiting representations for four candidates. This is a significant step forward, and you are not the only person who has been trying to produce such results. However, I believe that you are the first to successfully accomplish this. The only four candidate result that I am aware of is cited in your paper, and I only managed to obtain that by using a trick.

## New results with four candidates

- Condorcet Efficiency of Plurality
$\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \operatorname{Prob}(N)=\frac{10658098255011916449318509}{14352135440302080000000000}=0.74261 \ldots$
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( by integrating polynomial of degree 11 over a 13-dimensional polytope )
- Plurality vs. Plurality Runoff
$\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \operatorname{Prob}(N)=\frac{2988379676768359}{12173449145352192}=0.24548 \ldots$
( by integrating polynomial of degree 18 over a 5 -dimensional polytope )

WANT: generalization of Ehrhart theory, counting lattice points with polynomial weights

# The next generation Ehrhart theory Counting with polynomial weights 

## The next generation Ehrhart theory Counting with polynomial weights

- Two new methods:
- via rational generating functions


Baldoni, Berline,Vergne, 2009

- via local Euler-Maclaurin formula


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## Exploiting Symmetry in other

Polyhedral Computations?

## Representation Conversion

 up to symmetry
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(with Mathieu Dutour Sikirić and Frank Vallentin)

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- verified that Leech Lattice cell has 307 vertex orbits (Conway, Borcherds, et. al.)


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- computation of vertices for many different Voronoi cells of lattices
- verified that Leech Lattice cell has 307 vertex orbits (Conway, Borcherds, et. al.)
- The contact polytope of the Leech lattice, preprint at arXiv:0906.I427
- I orbit with 196,560 vertices in 24 dimensions
- I,I97,362,269,604,2I4,277,200 many facets in 232 orbits

A New C++ Tool

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- helps to compute linear automorphism groups


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- converts polyhedral representations using

Recursive Decomposition Methods (Incidence/Adjacency)
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EX: 4-dim. cube


| Input | n-1 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Output | 0 |

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DEF: A linear automorphism of $\left\{v_{1}, \ldots, v_{m}\right\} \subset \mathbb{R}^{n}$ is a regular matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ with $A v_{i}=v_{\sigma(i)}$ for some $\sigma \in S_{m}$

Detecting Linear Automorphisms

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THM: The group of linear automorphisms is equal to the automorphism group of the complete graph $K_{m}$

$$
\text { with edge labels } v_{i}^{t} Q^{-1} v_{j} \text {, where } Q=\sum_{i=1}^{m} v_{i} v_{i}^{t}
$$

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$$
Q=\left(\begin{array}{cc}
4 & -2 \\
-2 & 4
\end{array}\right)
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=> use NAUTY by Brendan McKay

## Adjacency Decomposition Method

(for vertex enumeration)

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- For each new orbit representative
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Representation conversion problem

BOTTLENECK: Stabilizer and In-Orbit computations

## Adjacency Decomposition Method

 (for vertex enumeration)- Find initial orbit(s) / representing vertice(s)
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Representation conversion problem

BOTTLENECK: Stabilizer and In-Orbit computations
=> Need of efficient data structures and algorithms for permutation groups: BSGS, (partition) backtracking

## Ingredient I: Permutation Group Algorithms

- BSGS and (partition) backtrack could be provided by GAP, MAGMA or SAGE


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- open source (new BSD license)
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## Vision:

- Create "integrated algorithms" combining tools of

Polyhedral Combinatorics and Computational Group Theory

## Ingredient II: <br> Established Representation Conversion Tools

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WHAT ABOUT Symmetry Exploiting Methods ?

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WHAT ABOUT Symmetry Exploiting Methods ?

- with David Bremner we work(ed) on
- pivoting methods up to symmetry

- incremental methods using fundamental domains


## Example I: Abhinav's Polytope

[Kum11] Abhinav Kumar, Elliptic fibrations on a generic Jacobian Kummer surface, arxiv:1105.1715

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~> computing all classes of elliptic divisors on ...

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```
H-representation
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Getting the group:
sympol --automorphisms-only input-file

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```
permutation group
9
    3 5,7 9,11 14,13 16,19 21,23 25,27 30,2
4
    33 1749308
```

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Getting vertices up to symmetry:
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H-representation begin
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Getting vertices up to symmetry : sympol --adm 40 input-file

```
permutation group
9
    3 5,7 9,11 14,13 16,19 21,23 25,27 30,2
    4
    33 17 49 308
    V-representation
    * UP TO SYMMETRY
    begin
    end
    permutation group
    * order 11520
    * w.r.t. to the original inequalities/verti
```


## Example II: Paco's Prismatoid

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## Example II: Paco's Prismatoid


sympol --idm-adm-level 01 --adjacencies input-file

## Example II: Paco's Prismatoid




sympol --idm-adm-level 01 --adjacencies input-file

## Example II: Paco's Prismatoid



|  | $x_{1}$ | $x_{2}$ | $x_{0}$ | $x_{4}$ | $x_{5}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\underset{2^{-}}{-}$ | ${ }^{0}$ | : | 0 |  | -1 |
| ${ }^{2}$ | ${ }_{0}^{0}$ | \% | 18 | ${ }^{-18}$ | -1 -1 -1 |
| $4^{-}$ | 0 | 0 | $-18$ | 0 | -1 |
| $6^{-}$ | 45 | 0 | 0 | : | -1 |
| $7^{6-}$ | -45 | 45 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | -1 |
| $\mathrm{g}^{-}$ | 0 | -45 | 0 | \% | -1 |
| $\mathrm{g}^{-}$ | 0 | 0 | 15 | 15 | -1 |
| $10^{-}$ | 0 | - | 15 | -15 | -1 |
| $1{ }^{-}$ | 0 | 0 | -15 | 15 | -1 |
| ${ }_{13}^{12}$ | $\stackrel{0}{30}$ | 3 | ${ }_{-15}^{-15}$ | ${ }_{-15}^{15}$ | -1 -1 |
| $14^{-}$ | -30 | 30 |  | 。 | -1 |
| $15^{-}$ | 30 | -30 | 0 | 0 | -1 |
| ${ }_{17}^{16}$ | -30 | -30 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | -1 |
| $17{ }^{-}$ | 40 | $\bigcirc$ | 10 | 0 | -1 |
| $\xrightarrow{18}$ | ${ }_{-40} 40$ | : | $-10$ | : | -1 |
| $20^{-}$ | -40 | 。 | -10 | - | -1 |
| $22^{-}$ | 0 | 40 | 0 | 10 | -1 |
| ${ }^{22-}$ | 0 | 40 | 0 | -10 | -1 |
| $\frac{23^{-}}{24^{-}}$ | ( 0 | -40 -40 | ${ }_{0}^{0}$ | 10 -10 | $\left.\begin{array}{l}-1 \\ -1\end{array}\right)$ |


sympol --idm-adm-level 01 --adjacencies input-file
~> neato ~>
(Graphviz)


## What else?

## Exploiting Symmetries in LPs and IPs

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- For LPs one can intersect feasible polyhedron with invariant linear subspace


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(not possible for IPs)


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- For LPs one can intersect feasible polyhedron with invariant linear subspace


## (not possible for IPs)



- For IPs several new approaches have been proposed

=> see survey "Symmetry in Integer Linear Programming" by François Margot (2010)


## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in IPs using invariant linear subspace



## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries

## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries

- in Lattice Point Counting


## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries

- in Lattice Point Counting
- in Polyhedral Representation Conversions



## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries

- in Lattice Point Counting
- in Polyhedral Representation Conversions
- in Integer Programming and MILPs



## Thomas

## Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries

- in Lattice Point Counting
- in Polyhedral Representation Conversions
- in Integer Programming and MILPs


Thomas


Universität Rostock 5 Tradicio et hovovis

## ToDo

- Create efficient computational tools / use more math!
- Integrate tools from Computational Group Theory


## Thanks!

