

***What can we learn from EU ETS experience?  
Recommendations for Effective Design and Efficient Trading***

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
Toronto, Canada, October 2011.

# Carbon Emissions Market

- Cap-and-Trade Market Mechanism
  - ▷ Ceiling for emissions
  - ▷ Compliance period
  - ▷ Market: price to comply with emission target
  - ▷ Least cost: internal abatement or acquisition of allowances
  - ▷ Trading between: Regulated emitters, Non-regulated emitters, Non-emitters

# Futures Allowance Dynamics

- $S_t$ : d-dimensional vector of discounted futures allowance price,  $S_t^i, t \leq T_i$  used for compliance at  $T_i$



# Futures Allowance Dynamics

- Discrete time framework with  $(\Omega, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}, \mathbb{P})$
- If the market is complete:

$$S_t^i = \xi_t^i S_{t-1}^i, \forall t \geq 1, \quad (1)$$

$\xi_t^i$  is a  $\mathcal{F}_t$ —measurable process.

- However:
  - ▷ Market is incomplete
  - ▷ Information set describing expected market position strongly affects the prices

# Futures Allowance Dynamics




Figure 1: Price distribution over time of Dec-2009 and Dec-2010 contracts

# Futures Allowance Dynamics

- So we model:

$$S_t^i = f_{t-1}^i(\xi_t^i, Y_{t-1}) S_{t-1}^i, \forall t \geq 1, \quad (2)$$

where

- ▷  $f_{t-1}^i$ :  $\mathcal{F}_{t-1}$ —measurable return function
- ▷  $Y_t$ : non-observable process reflecting the implied investors market expectation position at time  $t$  for the subsequent compliance dates.

# Futures Allowance Dynamics






Figure 2: Returns tree of the traded asset in absence of  $Y_t$  per time step.



**Figure 3:** Returns in presence of  $Y_t$  at  $t=1$ ,  $B_1 = \{\omega_i, i = 1, \dots, 8\}$ , and  $B_2 = \{\omega_i, i = 9, \dots, 16\}$ .

“-”: the market is expected to be short, “+”: the market is anticipated to be long.





**Figure 4:** Returns tree in presence of  $Y_t$  at  $t=2$ , where  $A_j = \{\omega_{(j-1)*4+i}, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.\}, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.$

# Futures Allowance Dynamics

- Parameter estimation
  - ▷ Focus on Dec-2009 ( $S_t^1$ ) and Dec 2010 ( $S_t^2$ ) contracts
  - ▷ January 2008- December 2009
  - ▷ Dec-2009 provides information about current market expected position
  - ▷ Assume  $\xi_t^i = \xi^i = \text{Empirical average}$
- We consider a special case for  $f_{t-1}^i$ 
  - ▷  $f_{t-1}^1(\xi_t^1, Y_{t-1}) = \xi^1 + Y_{t-1}^1$
  - ▷  $f_{t-1}^2(\xi_t^2, Y_{t-1}) = \xi^2 + Y_{t-1}^2$

# Futures Allowance Dynamics


- Estimated upward and downward movement returns:

$$\xi^{1u} = 1.021 \quad \xi^{1d} = 0.980$$

$$\xi^{2u} = 1.038 \quad \xi^{2d} = 0.982$$

- $Y_t^1$  i.i.d.:
  - Follows a Gaussian mixture distribution.
  - Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is accepted at a significance level of 99%.

Figure 5: Comparison of empirical CDF of  $Y_t^1$  with a Gaussian mixture CDF.



# Futures Allowance Dynamics


- $Y_t^2 = g(Y_t^1) + I_t + u_t$ 
  - ▷  $u_t$  i.i.d such that  $E[u_t | (Y_t^1, I_t)] = 0$
  - ▷  $I_t$  represents the impact of the expected market position at time  $T_1$  on  $Y_t^2$ .
- $I_t$  is not observed
  - ▷  $I_t = h_0 + h_1 MS_t + v_t$
  - ▷  $MS_t$ : Expected market position =  $Sign(Y_t^1)$ .
  - ▷  $E[Y_t^2 | (Y_t^1, I_t, MS_t)] = E[Y_t^2 | (Y_t^1, I_t)]$
- Regression:  $Y_t^2 = (h_0 + a_0) + \sum_{k=1}^p a_k (Y_t^1)^k + h_1 MS_t + \epsilon_t$

# Futures Allowance Dynamics

	With $MS_t$		$I_t$ omitted	
	$R^2$	$a_1$	$R^2$	$a_1$
p=0	68.21%	-	-	-
p=1	73.86%	0.541	60.35%	1.17
p=3	74.98%	0.278	62.67%	1.34
p=9	76.34%	0.467	70.34%	2.05
p=10	76.34%	0.467	70.34%	2.05

**Table 1:** Parameters resulting from the OLS estimator as function of the polynomial degree  $p$  in both cases where  $I_t$  is omitted or approximated by the proxy variable  $MS_t$ .

Figure 6: States of nature generated at time  $t + 1$  by a knot at time  $t$ .



# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

- Given random variable  $H \in \mathcal{L}^2(\mathcal{F}_T, P)$  describing the payoff

$$(V_0, \zeta) = \arg \min_{(c, \vartheta) \in \mathbb{R} \times \Theta} E_P[(H - c - G_T(\vartheta))^2], \quad (3)$$

where

$$\Theta := \{\text{predictable processes } \vartheta | \vartheta'_k \Delta S_k \in \mathcal{L}^2(P)\}, \quad (4)$$

$$G_T(\vartheta) := \sum_{j=1}^T \vartheta'_j \Delta S_j. \quad (5)$$



# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

**Definition 1.** *Non-Degeneracy Condition (ND): Suppose  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . The process  $(S_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \in \mathcal{L}_d^2(P)$  meets the non-degeneracy condition, if  $\forall k = 1, \dots, T$ , the random matrix*

$$\delta E[\Delta S_k^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}] - (E[\Delta S_k | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}])^2 \quad (6)$$

*is positive-semidefinite  $P$ -a.s.*

**Intuition:** in 1-dimension, (6) corresponds to:

$$Var(\Delta S_k^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}) > 0$$

i.e. we need some randomness or it all falls apart.

# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

**Proposition 2.** Assume a probability space  $(\Omega, \mathbb{F}, P)$  and stochastic process  $(S_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \in \mathcal{L}_d^2(P)$  adapted to the filtration  $\mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$  such that  $E[\Delta S_k^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}]$  is invertible and satisfies (ND). Therefore, there exists a unique solution  $(V_0, \zeta)$  solving (3), where:

$$\zeta_k = \varrho_k - \beta_k(V_0 + G_{k-1}(\zeta)), \quad (7)$$

$$V_0 = E_{\tilde{P}}[H], \quad (8)$$

$$\varrho_k = \left( E \left[ \Delta S_k^2 \prod_{j=k+1}^T (1 - \beta'_j \Delta S_j)^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1} \right] \right)^{-1} E \left[ H \Delta S_k \prod_{j=k+1}^T (1 - \beta'_j \Delta S_j) | \mathcal{F}_{k-1} \right], \quad (9)$$

$$\beta_k = \left( E \left[ \Delta S_k^2 \prod_{j=k+1}^T (1 - \beta'_j \Delta S_j)^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1} \right] \right)^{-1} E \left[ \Delta S_k \prod_{j=k+1}^T (1 - \beta'_j \Delta S_j) | \mathcal{F}_{k-1} \right], \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dP} = \frac{\tilde{Z}_0}{E[\tilde{Z}_0]}, \quad (11)$$

$$\tilde{Z}_0 = \prod_{j=1}^T (1 - \beta'_j \Delta S_j). \quad (12)$$

Furthermore, the unhedgeable risk defined by (3) is:

$$V_0^2 E [\tilde{Z}_0] - 2V_0 E [H \tilde{Z}_0] + E \left[ \left( H - \sum_{j=1}^T \varrho'_j \Delta S_j \prod_{l=j+1}^T (1 - \beta'_l \Delta S_l) \right)^2 \right] \quad (13)$$

## Proof.

- ▷ Same as presented in Schweizer (1996) for a 1-dimension processes
- ▷ We present the generalization of Rémillard and Rubenthaler (2009) for a multidimensional framework under very mild conditions

■


# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

- Price a derivative written on  $S_t^1$ 
  - ▷ Usual markets: Dynamic hedging position on  $S_t^1$
  - ▷ Figure 6: Returns of  $S_t^1$  and  $S_t^2$  have same dynamic pattern
  - ▷ Spread between prices: Evaluates the uncertainty of the expected market position
- Consider portfolios:
  - ▷  $A$ : trading on  $S^1$
  - ▷  $B$ : trading on both  $S^1$  and  $S^2$
- Short position scenario: prices quoted on 4/4/2008:

$$S_0^1 = \text{€}23.96 \text{ and } S_0^2 = \text{€}24.61.$$

**Figure 7:** Comparison between strategies  $A$  and  $B$  to price 5 period (5 day) calls written on  $S_t^1$  for different strike prices. Market is initially assumed to be short but expected to be long.

$$\text{Price ratio} = \frac{\text{Price A}}{\text{Price B}}, \text{Risk ratio} = \frac{\text{Unhedged risk A}}{\text{Unhedged risk B}}$$



# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

**Proposition 3.** *Assume a probability space  $(\Omega, \mathbb{F}, P)$ ,  $H \in \mathcal{L}^2(\mathcal{F}_T, P)$ , and stochastic process  $(S'_t, \Xi_t)'_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \in \mathcal{L}^2_{d+1}(P)$  adapted to the filtration  $\mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$  such that  $E[\Delta S_k^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}]$  and  $E[(\Delta S'_k, \Delta \Xi_k)'^2 | \mathcal{F}_{k-1}]$  are invertible and satisfy the non-degeneracy condition.*

*If  $P(E[(H - V_0 - G_T(\zeta, S))\Delta \Xi_T | \mathcal{F}_{T-1}] \neq 0) > 0$ , then hedging with  $(S'_t, \Xi_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$  is more efficient than hedging with  $(S_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ .*

# Pricing Framework: Investor Side

- Interdependency between compliance periods:
  - ▷ Need a multiperiod pricing framework
  - ▷ Reduce market position risk
  - ▷ Reduce liquidity: Non-emitters, who fear long term regulatory changes, may not trade
- An equivalent solution to encourage non-emitters to trade:
  - ▷ Need regulator's intervention
  - ▷ Provide new tradeable asset besides the right to emit

# Pricing Framework: Regulator Side

- New tradeable asset  $G$ 
  - ▷ Allow some of the intrinsic market risk to be hedged
  - ▷ Exogenous to market participants
  - ▷ Consider the social wealth of market parameters  $\Gamma$ , initially set up by the regulator
  - ▷ Consistent with arbitrage free theory
- Indifference pricing
  - ▷  $U(X^{x,\alpha}, \Gamma)$ : Utility function of the representative agent
  - ▷  $x$ : Initial wealth;  $\alpha$ : trading strategy
  - ▷ The price  $\nu_t(G_{T_1})$  of  $G$  is given via:

$$\sup_{\alpha} E_{\mathbb{P}} [U(X^{x,\alpha}, \Gamma)] = \sup_{\alpha} E_{\mathbb{P}} [U(X^{x+\nu_t(G_{T_1}),\alpha} - G, \Gamma)] \quad (14)$$



# Pricing Framework: Regulator Side

- Exponential utility

$$U(x) = -e^{-\gamma x}, \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R} \text{ and } \gamma > 0, \quad (15)$$

$\gamma$  is a parameter selected by the regulator (Elliot and Vander Hoek (2009)).

- Price obtained by moving backward

$$\nu_t(G_{T_1}) = \mathcal{E}_Q^{(t,t+1)}(\nu_{t+1}(G_{T_1})), \quad (16)$$

$$\mathcal{E}_Q^{(s,s+1)}(L_{s+1}) = E_Q \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_s} \log (E_{\mathbb{P}}(e^{\gamma_s Z_{s+1}} | \mathcal{F}_s \vee \mathcal{F}_{s+1}^S)) | \mathcal{F}_s \right), \quad (17)$$


$$\mathcal{E}_Q^{s,s}(L_s) = L_s, \quad \nu_{T_1}(G_{T_1}) = G_{T_1} \quad (18)$$

$$\mathcal{F}^S = \sigma\{S^1\}, \quad Q \text{ is the } S^1 \text{ equivalent martingale measure.} \quad (19)$$

# Pricing Framework: Regulator Side

- Example: Digital option
- Pays out a certain amount if a predefined event happens at future time  $T$
- Regulator announcement about the market position at time  $t$ : set of  $Y_t$  values observable
- Example: Regulator pays 1 unit if he announces the market is short and expected to remain short at the next compliance date
- Payment occurs if  $\omega \in \{\omega_1, \omega_5, \omega_9, \omega_{13}\}$  happens
- Strategy C: Investor holds position on  $S_t^1$  and  $\nu_t$ .

**Figure 8:** Risk ratio between strategy A and C for different values of  $\gamma - C(\gamma)$  – to price 5 period (5 day) calls for different strike prices.



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