

A model of emissions and the price of carbon

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→ countries must act against greenhouse gases and in particular CO_2

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→ indirect tax

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- each firm buys a certain number of certificates
- certificate = "right to pollute"
- firms can trade certificates
- end of the year, if global emissions are below κ , then nothing to pay
- else, each firm pays taxes for its emissions not covered by certificates.

As a tradable asset, we assume that the price of certificates satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned}dY_t &= Z_t dB_t \\ Y_T &= \lambda 1_{[\kappa, +\infty)}(E_T)\end{aligned}$$

under a probability \mathbb{Q} , where E are the global emissions.

A firm can trade certificates.

→ control θ (portfolio).

n firms whose emissions are assumed to be given by:

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$$E = \sum_{i=1}^n E^i.$$

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But it is in return of a cost: $c^i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, C^1 , strictly convex and satisfies Inada conditions, for each $t \in [0, T]$:

$$(c^i)'(-\infty) = -\infty \text{ and } (c^i)'(+\infty) = +\infty.$$

The wealth is:

$$X_t^i = X_t^{i,\xi,\theta} = x^i + \int_0^T \theta_t^i dY_t - \int_0^T c^i(\xi_t^i) dt - E_T^i Y_T.$$

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Given a utility function U^i , each firm wants to solve:

$$\sup_{(\xi,\theta) \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E} U^i(X_T^{i,\xi,\theta}).$$

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If Y is given, then there exists an optimal control $(\hat{\xi}^i, \hat{\theta}^i)$ with:

$$\hat{\xi}_t^i = (c')^{-1}(Y_t).$$

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In other words we want to solve:

$$\begin{aligned} dE_t^i &= \{b_t^i - [(c^i)']^{-1}(Y_t)\}dt + \sigma_t^i dB_t, & E_0^i &= 0, \text{ for each } i \\ dY_t &= Z_t dB_t, & Y_T &= \lambda 1_{[\kappa, +\infty)}(E_T). \end{aligned}$$

For certain b^i 's and σ^i 's, this leads to the forward-backward SDE:

$$\begin{aligned}dE_t &= \{b(t, E_t) - f(Y_t)\}dt + \sigma(t)dB_t, & E_0 &= 0 \\dY_t &= Z_t dB_t, & Y_T &= \lambda 1_{[\kappa, +\infty)}(E_T),\end{aligned}$$

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We approximate by a sequence of regular FBSDEs and show convergence. Finally: existence and uniqueness of the solution.

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the bigger is the decrease.

Incomplete market: introduction of a Brownian motion by firm.
Look for a global equilibrium, as in Karatzas and Shreve. Add the condition:

$$\forall t, \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_t^i = 0.$$

Short Bibliography

- Fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations and applications to optimal control, Peng and Wu.
- Forward-backward stochastic differential equations and their applications, Ma and Yong, Springer.
- Methods of Mathematical Finance, Karatzas and Shreve, Springer.